United Nations S/2002/466

Security Council

Distr.: General
19 April 2002
English
Original: Arabic

Letter dated 16 April 2002 from the Permanent Representative of the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council

With reference to the summary statement by the Secretary-General on matters of which the Security Council is seized and on the stage reached in their consideration (S/2002/30), issued on 15 March 2002, I have the honour to inform you that my country requests the retention of the following items listed in paragraph 9 of that document:

1. The Palestine question.

9. Letter dated 3 December 1971 from the Permanent Representatives of Algeria, Iraq, the Libyan Arab Republic and the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General (S/10409).

16. The Middle East problem, including the Palestinian question.

17. Request by the Libyan Arab Republic and Pakistan for consideration of the serious situation arising from recent developments in the occupied Arab territories (S/12017).

19. The question of the exercise by the Palestinian people of its inalienable rights.

22. Letter dated 19 February 1983 from the Permanent Representative of the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/15615).

23. Letter dated 8 August 1983 from the Chargé d'affaires a.i. of the Permanent Mission of the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/15914).

24. Letter dated 22 March 1984 from the Chargé d'affaires a.i. of the Permanent Mission of the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/16431).

27. Letter dated 15 April 1986 from the Chargé d'affaires a.i. of the Permanent Mission of the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/17991).

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29. Letter dated 4 January 1989 from the Chargé d'affaires a.i. of the Permanent Mission of the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/20364).

I should be grateful if you would have this letter circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Abuzed Omar **Dorda**
Permanent Representative

United Nations S/2002/467

Security Council

Distr.: General
19 April 2002

Original: English

Report of the Secretary-General on the situation concerning Western Sahara

I. Introduction

1. The present report is submitted pursuant to Security Council resolution 1394 (2002) of 27 February 2002, by which the Council extended the mandate of the United Nations Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara (MINURSO) until 30 April 2002 and requested me to provide a report on the situation before the end of the present mandate. Reaffirming its previous resolutions on the question of Western Sahara and its commitment to assist the parties to achieve a just, lasting and mutually acceptable solution, the Security Council decided to consider actively the options contained in my report of 19 February 2002 (S/2002/178). The present report covers developments since that date.

II. Activities of the Personal Envoy of the Secretary-General

2. During the reporting period, in anticipation of a decision by the Security Council concerning one of the options submitted for its consideration in my 19 February report (S/2002/178), my Personal Envoy, James A. Baker III, has had no direct contact with the parties. I expect that, subject to the proviso in paragraph 22 below, Mr. Baker will be prepared to resume his activities once the Security Council has taken a decision on how it wishes him to proceed with his efforts to assist in finding a solution to the dispute over Western Sahara.

III. Developments on the ground

3. My Special Representative, William L. Swing, has continued to maintain regular contacts with the parties. In Laayoune he has met regularly with the Coordinator of the Kingdom of Morocco with MINURSO, Governor Hamid Chabar. On 20 and 21 March 2002 my Special Representative, accompanied by the MINURSO Force Commander, visited the Tindouf area in Algeria, where they met with the Frente POLISARIO chief official dealing with defence issues, Mohammed Bouhali, and the Frente POLISARIO Coordinator with MINURSO, Emhamed Khaddad. During his visits to Algiers and Rabat on 31 March and 4 and 5 April, respectively, Mr. Swing met with senior Algerian and Moroccan officials. On 8 April he held talks in Nouakchott with the President of Mauritania, Maaouya Ould Sid' Ahmed Taya, and other senior Mauritanian officials. On 7 March my Special Representative visited Rabat, where he met individually with the Ambassadors of the five permanent members of the Security Council and the Ambassador of Spain.

A. Activities of the Identification Commission

4. During the reporting period, the Identification Commission continued its work in its offices in both Laayoune and Tindouf on the electronic archiving of the individual files of all persons who applied to be included in the list of voters for the referendum in Western Sahara. As at 15 April some 71,736 individual files out of a total of 244,643 had been processed.

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B. Military aspects

5. As at 15 April 2002 the military component of MINURSO stood at the authorized strength of 230 military personnel (see annex). Under the command of Brigadier General Claude Buze (Belgium), MINURSO continued to monitor the ceasefire between the Royal Moroccan Army and the Frente POLISARIO military forces, which has been in effect since 6 September 1991. There has been no indication on the ground that either side intends to resume hostilities in the near future.

6. During the first half of the reporting period, discussions continued between MINURSO and the Frente POLISARIO at various levels, with a view to lifting the restrictions imposed by the latter on the freedom of movement of United Nations military observers east of the defensive sandwall (berm) since January 2001. At a meeting on 21 March, the Frente POLISARIO informed my Special Representative of its decision to lift these restrictions. My Special Representative welcomed this positive development. MINURSO has been advised that the restrictions will be effectively lifted at the end of April, by which time members at all levels of the Frente POLISARIO chain of command will have been duly informed of the decision of their leadership. Accordingly, a coordination meeting between General Buze and the Frente POLISARIO military is scheduled to take place shortly, in order to ensure that the final arrangements for the full restoration of the freedom of movement of United Nations military observers east of the berm are in place.

7. On the western side of the berm, MINURSO military patrols continued to visit and inspect Royal Moroccan Army ground units larger than company size, in accordance with the ceasefire arrangements between MINURSO and the Royal Moroccan Army.

C. Civilian police aspects

8. As at 15 April the strength of the civilian police component of MINURSO stood at 25 officers (see annex) under the command of Inspector General Om Prakash Rathor (India). The officers continued to work around the clock to ensure the protection of sensitive files and materials at the Identification Commission centres at Laayoune and Tindouf.

D. Preparatory work for the repatriation of the Saharan refugees

9. During the reporting period my Special Representative visited the headquarters of several agencies working on humanitarian aspects of the Western Sahara conflict. On 28 February and 6 March he met with senior officials of the World Food Programme (WFP) and the European Commission Humanitarian Aid Office in Rome and Brussels, respectively, to discuss continuing food supply problems for the Western Saharan refugees in the Tindouf camps. On 5 and 31 March he met with representatives of the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) in Geneva and Tindouf, respectively, to discuss the overall humanitarian situation in the refugee camps and enquire about prospects for the implementation of cross-border confidence-building measures. I regret to inform the Council that, so far, there is no progress to report in regard to these measures due to a lack of consensus on the issue.

10. During the reporting period, UNHCR continued to carry out its mandated responsibilities for the Western Saharan refugees in the Tindouf camps and to coordinate with MINURSO. As a follow-up to the two workshops on international refugee law held in the Tindouf area in 2001, UNHCR organized another workshop in Algiers on 27 February 2002, in the presence of Algerian officials and refugee representatives, aimed at strengthening its protection capacity and establishing a more effective asylum framework in the host country. Two other workshops to achieve better coordination among the host country, key donors and humanitarian agencies took place in March 2002.

11. During the reporting period the food supply situation remained precarious because of continued difficulties in ensuring an adequate pipeline of balanced food for the refugees. The reduction of humanitarian assistance, in the absence of a durable solution to the question of Western Sahara, remained a major concern for the refugees and their leadership. Together with WFP, UNHCR coordinated a donor visit to the Tindouf camps on 10 and 11 April 2002. On 14 April WFP announced a two-year refugee aid project, estimated to cost $30 million, which could provide approximately 68,000 metric tons of aid to the refugees, pending approval by its Executive Board in

May. A donor briefing on Western Sahara is scheduled to take place at UNHCR headquarters in Geneva on 23 April.

E. Prisoners of war, persons unaccounted for and detainees

12. On 5 March my Special Representative met in Geneva with senior officials of the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) to discuss the Moroccan prisoners of war and the fate of all those unaccounted for since the beginning of the conflict. At present, 1,362 prisoners of war continue to be detained by the Frente POLISARIO. Of these, some 916 have been detained for more than 20 years and are currently the longest-held prisoners of war in the world. At the meeting with my Special Representative in Geneva on 5 March, ICRC once again expressed its deep concern at the poor physical and mental health of the prisoners.

F. Organization of African Unity

13. During the reporting period the observer delegation of the Organization of African Unity to MINURSO, led by Ambassador Yilma Tadesse (Ethiopia), continued to provide valuable support and cooperation to the Mission. I wish to reiterate my sincere appreciation for this contribution.

IV. Other developments

14. On 27 February President Abdelaziz Bouteflika of Algeria visited the refugee camps in the Tindouf area, where he met with the Frente POLISARIO leadership and attended festivities marking the twenty-sixth anniversary of the "Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic". This was the first reported visit to the refugee camps by an Algerian Head of State since the establishment of the camps in 1976. On 5 and 6 March King Mohammed VI of Morocco visited the towns of Dakhla and Laayoune in the Territory, accompanied by the Moroccan Cabinet. In Dakhla King Mohammed VI presided over a meeting of the Council of Ministers, the first time he had ever done so in the Territory. In a televised speech from Laayoune, the King announced the creation of a new agency for the social and economic development of the Territory. The Secretary-General of the Frente POLISARIO, Mohamed Abdelaziz, protested the King's visit in a letter dated 4 March addressed to the President of the Security Council.

15. In my last report I informed the Council that in late December 2001 Saharan detainees carried out a three-week hunger strike in a Laayoune prison, demanding better conditions. The hunger strike ended the following month, after the Moroccan authorities took a series of measures to address prison conditions.

V. Financial and logistical aspects

16. The General Assembly, by its resolution 55/262 of 14 June 2001, appropriated the amount of $48.8 million, equivalent to a monthly rate of some $4.1 million, for the maintenance of MINURSO for the period from 1 July 2001 to 30 June 2002. I shall continue to reassess the Mission's resource requirements in the light of the recent staff reductions and will revert to the General Assembly with consequential adjustments, if necessary.

17. As at 31 March 2002 unpaid assessed contributions to the special account for MINURSO amounted to $56,558,258. The total outstanding assessed contributions for all peacekeeping operations as at that date amounted to $1,423,008,273.

18. MINURSO's logistical infrastructure remains generally adequate, but some of the equipment is old, either approaching or beyond its expected life span. Evolving logistical requirements have already led the Mission to install three communication ground stations at military observer team sites, upgrade some information technology equipment and accommodation at various locations in the Mission area, and improve security conditions at headquarters in Laayoune. However, additional upgrades are required. Pending a decision by the Security Council concerning the extension of MINURSO's mandate, a technical assistance team from New York Headquarters is scheduled to visit the Mission in the near future to assess its logistical needs.

VI. Observations and recommendations

19. The humanitarian aspects of the overall situation affecting the question of Western Sahara remain a

source of great concern. The detention of 1,362 prisoners of war continues to be one of the most pressing humanitarian issues. As the Council is aware, I have already asked my Special Representative to assist ICRC in the discharge of its critical tasks. It is my earnest hope that members of the Council will join me once again in urging the Frente POLISARIO to release all remaining prisoners of war without further delay. I also hope that both parties will continue to cooperate with the efforts of ICRC to solve the problem of the fate of all those unaccounted for since the beginning of the conflict.

20. Given the current low levels of food supply in the refugee camps in the Tindouf area, I am also urging the international community to extend its financial support to enable UNHCR and WFP to meet the humanitarian needs of the refugees. As indicated in paragraph 9 above, my Special Representative has been in close contact with UNHCR and WFP to support efforts to address this problem. As the same time, I expect Morocco and the Frente POLISARIO to cooperate without further delay with UNHCR in the implementation of the long overdue confidence-building measures, as repeatedly called for by the Security Council since 1999. The plight of the separated refugee families demands no less.

21. It is my hope that the Security Council will decide by the end of the current mandate period how it wishes to proceed with regard to the future of the peace process in Western Sahara and that it will take action, as appropriate on the mandate of MINURSO. I believe that by choosing the option that it considers most likely to help resolve the conflict, the Council will indicate to the parties its determination to continue to look actively for a realistic solution to the conflict that will also contribute to long-term peace, stability and prosperity in the Maghreb region.

22. My Personal Envoy stands ready to undertake the activities that will be required under the option the Security Council chooses, in order to steer the parties towards a resolution of their dispute over Western Sahara, provided that the Council does not support any changes to options one, two or three that would require the concurrence of the parties. Such changes, as my Personal Envoy told the Council on 27 February 2002, would simply encourage a continuation of the conflict and the current stalemate. As always, I intend to lend all my support to my Personal Envoy in his difficult task.

Annex

United Nations Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara: contributions as at 15 April 2002

	Military observers	*Force commander*	*Troops*	*Civilian police**	*Total*
Argentina	1				1
Austria	3				3
Bangladesh	9				9
Belgium		1			1
China	16				16
Egypt	19				19
El Salvador	4				4
France	25				25
Ghana	8		7	3	18
Greece	1				1
Guinea	3				3
Honduras	12				12
Hungary	6				6
Ireland	3				3
India				2	2
Italy	5				5
Jordan				5	5
Kenya	9				9
Malaysia	13				13
Nigeria	6			3	9
Norway				2	2
Pakistan	6			2	8
Poland	5				5
Portugal	4			4	8
Republic of Korea			20		20
Russian Federation	25				25
Senegal				3	3
Sweden				1	1
Uruguay	13				13
United States of America	7				7
Total	**203**	**1**	**27**	**25**	**256**

* Authorized strength is 81.



Map No. 3691 Rev. 37 UNITED NATIONS
April 2002

Department of Public Information
Cartographic Section

United Nations A/56/926–S/2002/468

General Assembly
Security Council

Distr.: General
19 April 2002
English
Original: Arabic

General Assembly
Fifty-sixth session
Agenda item 42
The situation in the Middle East

Security Council
Fifty-seventh year

Letter dated 19 April 2002 from the Chargé d'affaires a.i. of the Permanent Mission of Lebanon to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

On instructions from Mr. Mahmud Hammud, the Lebanese Minister for Foreign Affairs and Emigrés, I should like to state the following:

Lebanon, in its capacity as Chairman of the Arab Summit, expresses its extreme indignation at and condemnation of the savage practices and outrages perpetrated by Israeli forces during their occupation of Palestinian towns, villages and camps, and their use of weapons of various kinds against peaceful civilians, which brought about the deaths of hundreds of women, older persons and children, particularly in the Jenin refugee camp. Such practices are in violation of all international covenants and norms as well as international humanitarian law, the Fourth Geneva Convention of 1949 and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.

Lebanon, in this same capacity, calls upon the Secretary-General of the United Nations to take urgent steps to establish a committee to investigate these violations and outrages committed by Israeli forces. It attaches considerable importance to receiving a favourable response from the United Nations and the Secretary-General to this request.

I should be grateful if you would have this letter circulated as a document of the General Assembly, under agenda item 42, and of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Houssam **Diab**
Chargé d'affaires a.i.

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United Nations S/2002/469

Security Council

Distr.: General
19 April 2002

Original: English

Report of the Secretary-General on the situation in Abkhazia, Georgia

I. Introduction

1. The present report is submitted pursuant to Security Council resolution 1393 (2002) of 31 January 2002, by which the Council extended the mandate of the United Nations Observer Mission in Georgia (UNOMIG) until 31 July 2002 and requested me to report three months from the date of the adoption of the resolution. It provides an update of the situation in Abkhazia, Georgia, since my report of 18 January 2002 (S/2002/88).

2. My Special Representative for Georgia, Dieter Boden, continues to head UNOMIG. He is assisted in his task by the Chief Military Observer, Major General Anis Ahmed Bajwa (Pakistan). The strength of UNOMIG on 1 April 2002 was 109 military observers (see annex).

II. Main developments

3. During the period under review, the efforts of UNOMIG focused on preparing the ground for the beginning of substantial negotiations between the Georgian and the Abkhaz sides on the core issue of the conflict, namely, the future status of Abkhazia within the State of Georgia. With the paper "Basic Principles for the Distribution of Competences between Tbilisi and Sukhumi" and the transmittal letter, prepared by Mr. Boden and fully supported by the Group of Friends of the Secretary-General, the conceptual basis for commencing such negotiations now exists (see S/2002/88, para. 3).

4. During visits to Sukhumi, Mr. Boden and representatives of the Group of Friends attempted to have the Abkhaz side agree to start negotiations on the basis of the paper on the distribution of competences. These attempts failed. The Abkhaz leadership consistently refused to accept the paper, claiming that Abkhazia's status had already been determined through its unilateral proclamation of independence (see S/1999/1087, para. 7). It also considered that the prevailing political climate, and in particular the unresolved security issue in the upper Kodori Valley, was not conducive to discussing substantive political aspects of the conflict.

5. In the absence of a regular dialogue between the parties, tensions continued in the political arena. Each accused the other of harbouring terrorists and promoting terrorist activities. Such mutual accusations found reflection in inflammatory statements by political movements and parties in the media. Some statements on the Georgian side even implied the possibility of a military option.

6. Efforts to bring about negotiations aimed at achieving a comprehensive settlement would be helped by a more substantive exchange between the two sides in the framework of the Coordinating Council, which was established as a mechanism for regular contacts, but has not met since January 2001. Recent meetings of the Council's Working Group I on security matters, on 29 March, and Working Group III on socio-economic matters, on 8 April, underscored the value of the Coordinating Council structure.

7. In Sukhumi, Abkhaz leader Vladislav Ardzinba has been mostly absent from the political scene since the summer of 2001, reportedly for health reasons. On 2 March "parliamentary elections" were held in Abkhazia, Georgia; they were declared illegitimate by

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Georgia, as well as by UNOMIG, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, the Council of Europe and the European Union. The main Abkhaz opposition party boycotted the elections due to alleged irregularities and breaches of local election law.

Kodori Valley

8. Following the clashes in the Kodori Valley in October 2001, Georgia introduced regular military troops into the upper Kodori Valley, in violation of the Moscow Agreement on a Ceasefire and Separation of Forces (see S/2002/88, para. 5). In order to remove this major source of tension and distrust and to return to full compliance with the Moscow Agreement, UNOMIG continued to seek the withdrawal of the Georgian military from the upper Kodori Valley.

9. Following the 17 January 2002 protocol (see S/2002/88, para. 5), General Bajwa, together with the Georgian Minister of Defence, General David Tevzadze, visited the upper Kodori Valley. This was the first time that a UNOMIG representative had had access to that part of the valley since the hostage-taking incident in December 2000 (see S/2001/59, para. 17). They travelled by Georgian helicopter. Because of the possible presence of irregulars armed with surface-to-air missiles, UNOMIG helicopters do not fly to the Kodori Valley. It will be recalled in this connection that a UNOMIG helicopter was shot down by such a missile in October 2001. In addition, landmines continue to be a problem in the area. The Georgian side agreed to remove newly laid mines in the valley when UNOMIG requires access.

10. The two sides met on 11 February, under the chairmanship of Mr. Boden, and again on 22 and 28 February, under the chairmanship of General Bajwa, to discuss the implementation of the 17 January protocol. On 12 March Mr. Boden reached agreement with the two sides on a joint UNOMIG/Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) patrol to the upper Kodori Valley and a subsequent meeting of Working Group I of the Coordinating Council, dealing with security issues. This agreement provided the basis for a two-day joint UNOMIG/CIS ground patrol to the upper Kodori Valley on 25 and 26 March.

11. As agreed on 12 March, Working Group I of the Coordinating Council, chaired by Mr. Boden and made up of representatives of UNOMIG, the CIS peacekeeping force and the two sides, met on 29 March. At the meeting the two sides provisionally agreed on an additional protocol, which, after further consultations in Sukhumi and Tbilisi, was signed on 2 April. This protocol established a 10 April deadline for the complete withdrawal of the Georgian regular forces from the upper Kodori Valley and the resumption of regular, at least weekly, patrols by UNOMIG and the CIS peacekeeping force. It also reaffirmed the Abkhaz commitment to provide security guarantees for the local civilian population. The first joint UNOMIG/CIS patrol under the 2 April protocol took place on 8 and 9 April. It received indications from the authorities in the upper valley that the Georgian side was in the process of withdrawing its regular troops.

12. On 11 April two CIS soldiers were severely injured by a booby trap while conducting road repairs between the last CIS checkpoint in the Abkhaz-controlled lower Kodori Valley and the broken bridge that marks the informal ceasefire line.

13. On 12 April the CIS peacekeeping force, without prior notification to UNOMIG, deployed 78 troops and heavy equipment by helicopter to Ajara in the upper Kodori Valley. The Georgian authorities reacted sharply to this action. Mr. Boden and General Bajwa, in contacts with Russian officials, urged the CIS peacekeeping force to withdraw from Ajara and advised that operations of this kind should be conducted in a manner that was mutually agreed and acceptable to all parties. President Shevardnadze visited the upper Kodori Valley to reassure the local population and demanded the immediate withdrawal of the CIS troops from the valley, failing which he threatened to fulfil the request of the Georgian Parliament of 11 October and seek the complete withdrawal of the CIS peacekeeping force from Georgia. On 13 April President Shevardnadze and President Putin discussed the issue by telephone. The CIS peacekeeping force began its withdrawal from the upper valley on the same day and completed it on 14 April. CIS commanders reported that in Ajara their troops had been encircled by armed individuals equipped with heavy mortars, among them regular Georgian troops as well as armed irregulars. Georgia denied any presence of its regular troops.

Gali and Zugdidi sectors

14. UNOMIG continued its regular daily patrolling in the Gali and Zugdidi sectors. In addition, responding to complaints about the possible presence of illegal armed

groups, special UNOMIG patrols were undertaken on a number of occasions to Gali, Gumurishi, Tqvarcheli and Akarmara. No evidence of such groups was found.

15. In the Gali sector, criminal and paramilitary activity continued to be the main security concern. In a serious incident on 14 March, the CIS peacekeeping force apprehended two Georgians after an exchange of fire near Primorsk and handed them over to the local Abkhaz authorities. This led to the retaliatory abduction on 18 March of four members of the CIS peacekeeping force. After lengthy negotiations, the four were exchanged for the two Georgians detained on 14 March. On 6 April two checkpoints of the CIS peacekeeping force came under fire and a truck was ambushed; there were no casualties.

16. In early March an armed robbery of a UNOMIG patrol, during which shots were fired, served as a reminder of the lack of effective law enforcement in the lower Gali region. At sector headquarters in Gali a United Nations security guard was assaulted while the UNOMIG medical team was rendering assistance to local individuals injured by the negligent discharge of a grenade launcher. There were also three break-in attempts at houses occupied by UNOMIG personnel. In response, the local authorities agreed to undertake patrols at night around UNOMIG lodgings.

17. On 27 March a series of explosions occurred in the Abkhaz Ochamchira district, with one person killed and several others seriously wounded. The incidents took place outside of, but in close proximity to, the restricted weapons zone.

18. In the Zugdidi sector, UNOMIG patrols were on occasion confronted with demonstrations by internally displaced persons, who are becoming increasingly critical of the Georgian central authorities, as well as of the CIS peacekeeping force and international organizations, because of their perceived incapacity to achieve progress in creating conditions for return. In one incident a patrol vehicle was hit by a stone, and in another a patrol was temporarily encircled and had equipment stolen from it before being allowed to proceed.

19. UNOMIG's freedom of movement was restricted for a total of three weeks in January and February when internally displaced persons blocked the major ceasefire line crossing points. In response, UNOMIG had to temporarily introduce restrictions on patrolling in the Zugdidi sector.

20. The mission continued to give high priority to the security of UNOMIG personnel. It maintains the concept of limited patrolling, i.e., patrolling during the daytime only, by two-man protected vehicles at all times and using main roads connecting populated areas. It has also suspended helicopter patrols in the sectors, with the exception of necessary administrative flights, which take a designated route over the Black Sea. Landmines also continue to be of concern, and the CIS peacekeeping force and the British non-governmental organization Halo Trust continued to deactivate mines in UNOMIG's area of responsibility. On 25 March a Halo Trust deminer received serious injuries during a mine-clearing operation.

21. The Joint Fact-Finding Group, which brings together UNOMIG, the CIS peacekeeping force and the two sides, continued its work. The parties demonstrated a greater willingness to participate. Four cases have been concluded since the last report and six investigations are ongoing. Continuity of evidence continued to be a problem; response times improved.

III. Cooperation with the collective peacekeeping forces of the Commonwealth of Independent States

22. The close cooperation between UNOMIG and the CIS peacekeeping force developed further as a result of the joint patrols to the Kodori Valley, except for a serious lapse when the CIS peacekeeping force unilaterally deployed to the upper Kodori Valley on 12 April. Regular meetings took place between the staff of both organizations, complementing the usual exchanges between the Chief Military Observer and the Commander of the CIS peacekeeping force. The weekly quadripartite meetings continue to provide a forum for regular contact.

23. On 31 January 2002 Georgia formally requested the extension of the mandate of the CIS peacekeeping force until 30 June 2002. The CIS agreed to the extension at the end of March. Meanwhile, the Georgian and Russian authorities have expressed their intent to discuss a modification of the mandate and the zone of operation of the force, as Georgia had requested.

IV. Humanitarian situation and human rights

24. During the reporting period, international humanitarian agencies and non-governmental organizations continued programmes (see S/2001/1008, paras. 34 and 35) to meet the acute needs of the most vulnerable persons in Abkhazia, Georgia. At the same time, restrictions on border crossings between the Russian Federation and Abkhazia, Georgia, at the Psou River continued to hamper their operations. These difficulties were compounded by the protest blockades in February, which hindered movement across the ceasefire line. The Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs continued, from its main office in Tbilisi and its sub-offices in Sukhumi and Tskhinvali, to monitor the overall humanitarian situation and facilitate the response provided by international and national aid agencies, including by disseminating information and analysis, advocating free and unhindered access for humanitarian assistance and supporting the development of a comprehensive inter-agency contingency plan for Georgia.

25. The Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) continued its small-scale humanitarian operation in Abkhazia, Georgia. The rehabilitation work in 24 schools (22 in the Gali region and 2 in the Ochamchira region), which was started in the second half of 2001, has been completed in most of the sites on a "self-help" basis. This means that the material for the rehabilitation was provided by UNHCR, while the rehabilitation work itself was done by the local population under the supervision of a school committee composed of parents and teachers. In cooperation with the local authorities, UNHCR has begun to identify and assess other schools, in Gali and beyond, in need of basic rehabilitation in 2002.

26. Phase I of the telecommunications rehabilitation programme, financed by the German Government and implemented by the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) under the auspices of Working Group III of the Coordinating Council, on socio-economic matters, was completed (see S/2002/88, para. 21). One of the concrete outputs was the re-establishment of the reception of Georgian television channels in the upper Kodori Valley. The second phase is expected to begin in early spring. On 8 April Working Group III met for the first time in 18 months in Sukhumi under the chairmanship of the UNDP Resident Coordinator. The ministerial-level participants agreed, inter alia, on cooperation in the removal of radioactive waste from Sukhumi and the supply of medicines for the treatment of oncological diseases.

27. The human rights situation in Abkhazia, Georgia, showed few signs of improvement. Law enforcement mechanisms remained too weak to properly administer justice and halt violations of basic human rights, particularly in the security zone. In this context, the undefined and insecure status of spontaneous returnees to the Gali district is of major concern. The ethnic Georgian population in the Gali district continued to be denied the right to education in its native tongue, although elective courses in the Georgian language have recently been initiated in one of the Gali schools. The heads of the Education Departments of the two sides met on 11 March and 8 April to overcome the current obstacles. They agreed on a follow-up meeting, scheduled for 22 April, for further discussions on this matter.

28. The United Nations Human Rights Office in Abkhazia, Georgia, continued to advise the local population, monitor selected court trials, and visit places of pre-trial detention. It also assisted with building the capacity of local non-governmental organizations and raising awareness of human rights among the local population. In the absence of the consent of the two sides for establishing a branch human rights office in Gali town, the staff members of the main office visit the Gali district regularly in order to cover the most basic needs in that area.

V. Support issues

29. Efforts are under way to maintain and improve the quality of support for UNOMIG and to enable the Mission to carry out quick impact projects and infrastructure repairs in the future. The Mission is also working to improve the maintenance of its armoured vehicles, air mobility, and engineering and communication support. By the end of July 2002, UNOMIG offices will be moved from the current hotel complex headquarters in Sukhumi to a new container office compound within the same location, which provides better security and working conditions for its personnel. The new office compound will be fenced in, and access will be under the control of the UNOMIG

Security Section. This relocation will free up rooms and enable staff to live in more acceptable conditions.

VI. Observations

30. The situation in the Georgian-Abkhaz conflict zone during the reporting period was in general calmer than during the second half of last year. Nevertheless, in the absence of a negotiating process, tension has remained high in the mission area, which is within a generally volatile region. The conflict has gone on too long and should not be allowed to simmer. The early launching of an active negotiating process, addressing the core issue of the future status of Abkhazia within the State of Georgia, and full compliance with existing agreements and protocols are urgently required. In addition, the Coordinating Council should meet soon to tackle pressing issues relating to security, the return of displaced persons and economic rehabilitation.

31. My Special Representative has made strenuous efforts to bring about negotiations between the Abkhaz and Georgian sides on the basis of the paper on the distribution of competences and the transmittal letter. These efforts will continue with the support, I trust, of the Security Council and the Group of Friends. The two parties should, as soon as possible, address and resolve the key political issues between them. The Abkhaz side, in particular, should reconsider its present position and agree to enter into negotiations on the basis of the competences paper, that being the best available means by which to advance their legitimate concerns.

32. The continuing presence of Georgian troops in the upper Kodori Valley, in violation of the Moscow Agreement, has been a major source of tension and distrust. Georgia claims that it has now withdrawn those troops. It should, however, create the conditions for an independent verification of this withdrawal through regular patrols of UNOMIG and the CIS peacekeeping force, based on satisfactory security arrangements. This, together with security guarantees for the local population, should lead to a stabilization of the situation in the Kodori Valley as a whole.

33. It is regrettable that no progress was made on the safe, secure and dignified return of internally displaced persons to their places of origin, in accordance with international law and as stipulated in the Quadripartite Agreement of 4 April 1994. I call in particular upon the Abkhaz side to start moving this process forward. Equally, there is a need to start working in earnest on the implementation of the recommendations contained in the March 2001 Yalta Programme of Action on Confidence-building (see S/2001/242, annex), and the recommendations of the joint assessment mission to the Gali region (see S/2001/59, annex II).

34. In view of the unstable situation in which UNOMIG operates, the safety of its staff remains a central concern. Both sides have the responsibility to ensure security for the Mission at all times and to allow UNOMIG to return to its full operational capacity, which had to be restricted following the shooting down of a United Nations helicopter in October 2001. The technical investigation into the shooting down is still being conducted by Ukraine; meanwhile, UNOMIG has started its own investigation into the circumstances of the helicopter flight pending the results of the Ukrainian investigation. The perpetrators of this criminal act, as well as of the previous hostage-takings, need to be identified and brought to justice.

35. In conclusion, I would like to reiterate my deep appreciation for the tireless efforts of Special Representative Dieter Boden and Chief Military Observer Major General Anis Ahmed Bajwa in the cause of peace, and for the determination and courage of the men and women of UNOMIG, who carry out their duties under difficult and often dangerous circumstances.

Annex

Countries providing military observers (as at April 2002)

Country	*Military observers*
Albania	1
Austria	2
Bangladesh	7
Czech Republic	5
Denmark	6
Egypt	3
France	3
Germany	11
Greece	4
Hungary	7
Indonesia	4
Jordan	6
Pakistan	9
Poland	4
Republic of Korea	5
Russian Federation	3
Sweden	5
Switzerland	4
Turkey	5
Ukraine	3
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland	7
United States of America	2
Uruguay	3
Total	**109**

Map No. 3837 Rev. 32 UNITED NATIONS
April 2002

Department of Public Information
Cartographic Section

United Nations S/2002/470

Security Council

Distr.: General
19 April 2002

Original: English

Letter dated 19 April 2002 from the Chairman of the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1343 (2001) concerning Liberia addressed to the President of the Security Council

On behalf of the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1343 (2001) concerning Liberia and in accordance with paragraph 4 of resolution 1395 (2002), I have the honour to submit, as agreed at the 12th meeting of the Committee, held today, the report of the Panel of Experts (see annex).

In this connection, the Committee would appreciate it if the present letter together with its enclosure were brought to the attention of the members of the Security Council and issued as a document of the Council.

(*Signed*) Kishore **Mahbubani**
Chairman
Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1343 (2001)
concerning Liberia

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Annex

11 April 2002

Letter dated 11 April 2002 from the Panel of Experts on Liberia to the Chairman of the Committee established pursuant to resolution 1343 (2001) concerning Liberia

We have the honour to enclose the report of the Panel of Experts on Liberia, in accordance with paragraph 4 of Security Council resolution 1395 (2002).

(*Signed*) Atabou **Bodian**

(*Signed*) Johan **Peleman**

(*Signed*) Harjit **Sandhu**

(*Signed*) Alex **Vines**

Report of the Panel of Experts appointed pursuant to Security Council resolution 1395 (2002), paragraph 4, in relation to Liberia

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Abbreviations

AFL	Armed Forces of Liberia
BIVAC	Bureau Veritas International
BMA	Bureau of Maritime Affairs
CDF	Civil Defence Force
ECOMOG	ECOWAS Monitoring Group
ECOWAS	Economic Community of West African States
FOB	Freight on board
HRD	Hoge Raad voor Diamant/High Diamond Council (Belgium)
ICAO	International Civil Aviation Organization
Interpol	International Criminal Police Organization
IMF	International Monetary Fund
LISCR	Liberian International Shipping and Corporate Registry
LURD	Liberians United for Reconciliation and Democracy
Roberts FIR	Roberts Flight Information Region
RUF	Revolutionary United Front
RUFP	RUF Party
SLA	Sierra Leone Army
RSLAF	Republic of Sierra Leone Armed Forces (former SLA)
ULIMO	United Liberation Movement for Democracy in Liberia
UNAMSIL	United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNOL	United Nations Peace-building Support Office in Liberia

Executive summary

1. Since the Panel submitted its last report (S/2001/1015) in October 2001, the war in Liberia's Lofa County has spread towards Monrovia and a state of emergency was declared in February 2002. In neighbouring Sierra Leone in contrast the peace process is running smoothly and in January 2002 President Kabbah declared the conflict over. RUF has transformed itself from a brutal rebel force into a political party preparing to contest the presidential and parliamentary multi-party elections in May 2002.

2. During this investigation the Panel tried to assess whether any renegade RUF structures remained intact in Liberia that could pose a threat to the election process and its aftermath in Sierra Leone. Although the Panel found credible evidence of small clusters of ex-RUF combatants fighting in Liberia as guns for hire for both the Government and rebels there did not seem to be a connection with RUFP.

3. The Panel also attempted to locate the last unaccounted-for key RUF military commander Sam "Maskita" Bockarie. Despite persistent rumours that he is active in Liberia the Panel could only confirm that he travelled under a false name to Ghana in 2001. We also established that his wife and mother live in Monrovia although they are preparing to return to Sierra Leone soon. Beyond these facts all about Bockarie is rumour and his name has entered regional mythology and contributed to an inflation of the use of the "Mosquito" label.

Arms and air transportation

Arms

4. The Panel found credible evidence that Liberia keeps violating the arms embargo and that the numerous special units deployed by the Government carry new weaponry and ammunition. The Panel is also worried about the continuing arms build-up in other neighbouring countries. In view of the volatile situation in the subregion the Panel recommends that:

- The arms embargo on Liberia should continue and be regularly monitored for violations.
- The ECOWAS moratorium relating to small arms should be broadened to an information exchange mechanism for all weapons types. This new mechanism should be binding on both supplying and receiving countries.
- All arms-producing and exporting countries should abstain from supplying weapons to each Mano River Union country.
- An immediate embargo should be imposed on all non-State actors in the Mano River Union countries, including the dissident groups constituting LURD.

Air transportation

5. The Panel reiterates the recommendations made on the issue of air transportation in its previous report (S/2001/1015).

6. Air transportation remains important for the violation of the arms embargo. In this report the Panel describes a series of suspicious flights to Monrovia, one of which crash-landed near Roberts International Airport on 15 February 2002. In view

of the irregularities associated with these flights, the Panel recommends that Liberia be requested to supply to the Sanctions Committee within three months a full report on:

- Basic facts about the crash, including pictures of the wrecked aircraft and the crash site.
- The nature of the flights from and to N'Djamena on 15 February, 25 February and 5 March 2002.
- The irregularities relating to the registration and flight plans of the flights with registration numbers ER-ADL, ER-ACZ and ER-ACL.
- A full list of the crew, the pilots and the cargo on board these flights.
- The flight plans for these flights.
- The contracts showing the consignee of these flights.
- The fuel manifests for all these flights.
- The payments made for these flights.

7. The Panel further recommends that, in order to verify the findings of that report, an independent investigation be conducted.

Diamonds

8. The imposition of an embargo on the export of Liberian rough diamonds, coupled with progress in the Sierra Leone peace process, has continued to ensure that "Liberian"-labelled rough have disappeared from the official markets. The sanctions and the spreading internal conflict in Liberia have greatly affected domestic production. Fighting in the last few months in the richest diamond-producing areas of western Liberia and rebel occupation of some of these areas has cut diamond production. This has contributed to a further decline in the supply of Liberian diamonds for smuggling and the LURD rebels have begun trading in "conflict diamonds". Many artisanal miners have shifted to alluvial gold production and moved to the peaceful south-east of the country.

9. The Panel found that Liberian diamonds were still smuggled into neighbouring countries but believes the volume has declined in recent months because of the conflict. The Panel continues to believe that Liberia should have its own credible certification scheme so that there is less incentive for Liberian rough to be deliberately mixed with the rough of neighbouring countries.

Recommendation on diamonds

10. The Panel recommends that the United Nations should encourage its Member States to assist the Government of Liberia in setting up a credible and transparent certification scheme which is independently audited by an internationally recognized audit company. This scheme should be independently assessed and effective in order to facilitate the consideration of a monitored suspension of the diamond ban by the Security Council.

The travel ban

11. In recent months there has been better compliance by Liberian officials with the travel ban. However, a small number of key individuals continue to regularly violate the ban and the Panel has documented how several of them have been issued Liberian passports with false names to assist their travel. Abidjan's Inte ıational Airport remains a loophole and the Ivorian authorities continue to turn a blind eye to arriving Liberian officials subject to the United Nations travel ban.

12. The travel ban may have contributed to significant financial savings for the Government. International travel consumed US$ 600,000 of government funds per month in 1999. A ban on travel may have reduced government expenditures by about $400,000 per month. According to the Ministry of Finance these funds have been used to pay for fuel imports and more recently to help to pay arrears of civil servants' salaries.

Recommendation on the travel ban

13. The travel ban has continued to be a source of complaints and individuals have continued to ask on what grounds their names had been placed on the list. The Panel believes that the current list of 129 names is too long, and that this list is cumbersome and should be reduced to a list of all cabinet members, key government officials and individuals documented in Panel reports as having violated United Nations sanctions or consistently obstructed investigation.

Introduction

A. General

14. In pursuance of paragraph 5 of Security Council resolution 1395 (2002) of 27 February 2002 concerning Liberia, the Secretary-General on 6 March 2002 appointed a Panel of Experts (see annex I) to conduct a follow-up assessment mission to Liberia and neighbouring countries to investigate and compile a brief independent audit of the compliance by the Government of Liberia with paragraph 2 and of any violations of paragraphs 5, 6 and 7 of resolution 1343 (2001).

15. The Panel recognized that the demand made to the Government of Liberia under paragraph 2 of resolution 1343 (2001) to immediately cease its support for RUF in Sierra Leone and for other armed rebel groups in the region required the following concrete steps:

- Expel all Revolutionary United Front members from Liberia.
- Cease all financial and military support to RUF.
- Cease all direct or indirect import of Sierra Leone rough diamonds which are not controlled through the certificate of origin regime of Sierra Leone.
- Freeze funds or financial resources or assets controlled directly or indirectly by RUF.
- Ground all Liberia-registered aircraft operating within its jurisdiction until it updates its register of aircraft according to International Civil Aviation Organization guidelines.

16. By paragraph 5 of resolution 1343 (2001) the Security Council imposed a tightened arms embargo against Liberia, under which, in particular:

- All States would prevent the sale or supply to Liberia of arms and related materiel of all types, whether or not originating in their territories.
- All States would prevent any provision to Liberia, by their nationals or from their territories, of technical training or assistance related to the provision, manufacture, maintenance or use of arms and related materiel of all types.

17. By paragraph 6 of resolution 1343 (2001) the Council prohibited the direct or indirect import of all rough diamonds from Liberia, irrespective of whether such diamonds originated in Liberia.

18. By paragraph 7 of resolution 1343 (2001), all States were required to prevent the entry into or transit through their territories of senior members of the Government of Liberia and its armed forces and their spouses and any other individuals providing financial and military support to armed rebel groups in countries neighbouring Liberia. On 4 June 2001, the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1343 (2001) concerning Liberia published a list of 136 persons to be covered by this travel ban. Five names were deleted from the list on 19 December 2001 and two on 11 March 2002.

19. In a letter dated 20 March 2002, the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Liberia informed the Security Council that the Government of Liberia had taken measures to provide for its legitimate self-defence in the wake of persistent armed attacks against its territory. The Panel remained cognizant of all such correspondence from the Government of Liberia, made available to it by the Security Council Committee and by the Task Force of the Government of Liberia.

20. The Panel of Experts consisted of Mr. Atabou Bodian (Senegal), expert from the International Civil Aviation Organization; Mr. Johan Peleman (Belgium) arms and transportation expert; Mr. Harjit S. Sandhu (India), expert from Interpol; and Mr. Alex Vines (United Kingdom), diamond expert.

21. The Panel held its first organizational meeting at United Nations Headquarters from 13 to 16 March 2002, and it was agreed with the Security Council Committee that the Panel's assessment report would be submitted on 11 April 2002.

22. The Panel received logistical and moral support from the Security Council Committee, the United Nations Secretariat, the United Nations Peace-building Support Office in Liberia, the United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone and United Nations Development Programme officials in Guinea, Côte d'Ivoire, Sierra Leone and Liberia. *The present report is a supplement to the previous report of the Panel (S/2001/1015), in which the Panel highlighted in detail several cases of violations of resolution 1343 (2001).*

B. Mandate of the Panel: a dilemma

23. The Panel's mandate is described in section A above. The Panel was repeatedly reminded that the sanctions imposed on the Government of Liberia under resolution 1343 (2001) resulted from the report of the Panel of Experts on Sierra Leone (S/2000/1195), which concluded that the Government of Liberia was actively aiding and abetting war in Sierra Leone by providing military and financial support

to RUF. Since then, the Government of Liberia has claimed that it has completely disassociated itself from RUF, which has since transformed itself into a political party (RUFP) in Sierra Leone. On 18 January 2002 the President of Sierra Leone declared the end of war in that country.

24. Under the changed set of circumstances, a question of reasonableness has been raised as to the continuation of sanctions against Liberia pursuant to resolution 1343 (2001). The main concern of the Panel is the continuing presence in Liberia of hardcore elements of RUF, now referred to as Independent RUF or RUF-I, and its possible repercussions for the whole subregion. The Panel remained cognizant, throughout its work, of its role and its responsibility in helping to end the suffering of the people of the subregion.

C. Methodology of investigation

25. **Questionnaires.** The Panel requested specific information from the relevant countries, through their Permanent Missions to the United Nations, regarding the movement of certain suspicious aircraft used for illegal transportation of arms and ammunition.

26. **Interviews.** In each country visited, the Panel interviewed government authorities and, where relevant, diplomatic missions, civil society organizations, aid agencies, private sector firms and journalists (see annex II). The Panel also contacted a number of key individuals whose names have been a subject of interest and controversy in recent months in connection with the crisis in the subregion. Given the sensitive nature of the subjects investigated by the Panel, however, it should be noted that many individuals spoke under conditions of confidentiality. Numerous meetings have therefore not been listed.

27. **Visits to countries.** The Panel travelled to each of the three Mano River Union countries — Guinea, Liberia and Sierra Leone — twice during its mandate. The Panel also travelled to Côte d'Ivoire.

28. **Field trips.** Within the limited time available, the Panel visited border areas in Liberia, Guinea, Sierra Leone and Côte d'Ivoire to obtain first-hand information about the realities on the ground. The Panel wanted to obtain recent information on the exact nature of the conflict in Lofa, a county in Liberia that has become inaccessible because of the escalating war between LURD and the different militias and forces of the Government of Liberia. In Liberia, the entire Panel visited Kakata. A Panel member also visited Charlesville and Harbel. In Sierra Leone, the entire Panel visited Bo, Kenema and Buedu. In Guinea, three members visited Macenta, Kuankan, Daro, Badaro and Nzérékoré. In Côte d'Ivoire, the Panel visited Danane and Guiglo. During these field visits, the Panel spoke to various factions involved in the conflict in the subregion, the prominent ones being RUF, the Civil Defence Force, the Liberians United for Reconciliation and Democracy and the Armed Forces of Liberia. The Panel also interviewed a large number of internally displaced persons and refugees spread over all four countries of the subregion.

29. **Police and judicial records.** The Panel was able to access police and judicial records of certain cases under investigation and under trial linked to trafficking of arms and ammunition in the West African subregion.

D. Standards of verification

30. The Panel agreed at the outset of its work to use high evidentiary standards in its investigations. This required at least two credible and independent sources of information to substantiate a finding. Wherever possible, the Panel also agreed to put allegations to those concerned so as to allow them the right of reply.

31. During the investigation, where possible, the Panel shared the relevant information and cooperated with the States concerned for further thorough investigation by them. A significant number of countries came forward with useful information on individuals behind certain shady companies and their financial transactions.

32. In addition to its own detailed verification, the Panel received corroborating information from international law enforcement agencies. The assistance of Interpol specialists was also called upon as required. Throughout its investigation, the Panel did not rely solely on oral testimonies. Corroborative documentary and circumstantial evidence was always insisted on. The evidence, therefore, is incontrovertible and irrefutable.

I. Liberia's internal conflict and the Revolutionary United Front

A. The Lofa war

33. The Panel wanted to get a clear picture of the unfolding situation in Lofa, a county where access for independent observers is impossible. This motivated the Panel to visit the areas of Sierra Leone and Guinea that border Lofa County to try to obtain eyewitness accounts from recently arrived refugees in those areas. The Panel also interviewed non-governmental organization workers, United Nations agencies, local authorities, government officials and members of LURD.

34. In 2002 the impact of the Lofa war was felt in Monrovia. President Charles Taylor declared a state of emergency with immediate effect on 8 February after shooting was reported at Kley Junction, some 50 km north of Monrovia. A few days before, LURD rebels had also attacked Tubmanberg.

35. Since mid-April 1999, when rebels crossed into Liberia from Guinea and attacked the Lofa County town of Voinjama, what has now become to be called the LURD insurgency has become a growing problem for the Government of Liberia. Fighting between LURD and the Government has flared up since the end of November 2001, destroying the assets of timber companies and creating a major problem of internally displaced persons that have been fleeing Lofa.

36. The Liberians United for Reconciliation and Democracy itself was formed in February 2000 a result of a merger of the Justice Coalition for Liberia, the Organization of Displaced Liberians and a group calling itself the Union of Democratic Forces of Liberia. LURD says it has no involvement with former Liberian warlords, but many of its members formerly fought for the United Liberation Movement for Democracy or for the ULIMO-J and ULIMO-K factions. The LURD leadership acknowledged to the Panel that there are serious difficulties

in striking a balance between all the different ethnic and other interest groups within the organization.

37. The LURD leadership includes Voinjama-based Sekou Dammante Conneh, a Liberian Mandingo with personal ties to President Lansana Conté through his wife, Ayesha Conneh, who is spiritual adviser to President Conté. General Joe Wylie, a friend of former ULIMO-J leader Roosevelt Johnson, is a military advisor based in Conakry and William Hanson, a former human rights activist, is their political spokesperson. When the Panel first visited the Guinean border towns of Macenta, Guéckédou and Nzérékoré in September 2001, armed LURD combatants were clearly visible. During its latest visit to those towns the Panel found that the armed men had moved into Liberia, with Voinjama as their main stronghold. They form a de facto buffer zone protecting the Guinean border.

38. LURD has probably some 2,000 men fighting for it. These are a motley bunch, including Liberian dissidents that had formerly fought for the Sierra Leone "Special Forces", some 500 Kamajor fighters, defectors from AFL and other units from Liberia and up to 200 ex-RUF fighters from Sierra Leone who have been offered several hundred dollars in cash and the fruits of war to fight for LURD.

39. LURD has been recruiting in Guinea, Sierra Leone and Côte d'Ivoire and in Ghana. In March 2002, at the Brookefields Hotel in Freetown, the Panel interviewed young men who were ex-CDF, ULIMO-K and ULIMO-J fighters. They explained enthusiastically that they were waiting for orders to join LURD from Joe Wylie in Conakry and that some 50 of their colleagues had left in dribs and drabs to join the rebels by way of Guinea or down to the Liberian border via Zimmi. They were being promised a retention fee of US$ 200 and the booty of conflict.

40. A LURD commander told the Panel that the rebels had two brigades (First and Second), each consisting of four battalions (Thunder, Marine, Wide Door and Special Force).

41. The LURD leadership claims to have conducted two offensives in Liberia. In January 2001 an offensive following incursions into Guinea by RUF sought to capture Gbarnga but failed. LURD began a second military offensive in November 2001, which drove south along the Sierra Leone border in an effort to join up with dissidents waiting along the southern part of the border. Voinjama fell to LURD early in December 2001, and in the following weeks Vahun and later Foya were under attack. A counter-offensive by government forces from Kolahun attacked the LURD rear and retook Foya on 25 December; it has been contested ever since. Both sides subsequently contested other towns, such as Kolahun and Zor-Zor. In March attacks were reported near Suehn and two ambushes on the road between the diamond-mining towns of Lofa Bridge and Gbarma. Early in April incidents occurred at Kakata and at Tubmanberg (Bomi Hills) and at Bong Town, bringing the conflict closer to the capital. During all these confrontations the main victims are civilians, who have their assets looted by either one side or the other.

42. The role played by the Government's uncoordinated security units in the conflict appears to have inflamed the situation. Salary payments of many months are owed to the Armed Forces of Liberia although elite units such as the Anti-Terrorist Unit and the Special Security Service are more regularly paid. Military action offers poorly paid soldiers and militia members the chance to loot. The Panel witnessed

this during its visit to Kakata on 4 April, only a few hours after an incident in which armed individuals killed two Lebanese traders.

43. There is also suspicion that the unfolding humanitarian crisis and the level of government setbacks is sometimes being stage-managed by the authorities in an attempt to force the United Nations to lift the arms embargo and sanctions imposed on Liberia. The rebels in turn capitalize on these incidents to claim military progress.

44. Many of the displaced simply flee upon rumours of an upcoming attack or hearing gunshots. In many of the incidents there are no casualties and indeed few signs of fighting, but plentiful evidence of looting. The incidents do displace people, and in recent months military unrest in north-western Liberia has forced tens of thousands of refugees to move south to live in makeshift camps. The Liberia Refugee, Repatriation and Resettlement Commission has registered over 32,000 displaced persons from Lofa. The war in Lofa County has prevented any large-scale repatriation of refugees and is causing a steady influx into neighbouring countries.

B. Looking for "Mosquito" and his RUF in Liberia

45. Sam "Maskita" Bockarie is the last prominent individual of the former armed RUF not accounted for. During its previous mandate the Panel of Experts tracked Bockarie's movements until late September 2001. He had left Liberia and resided in a number of locations, including Ghana, since mid-2001. Subsequent to the issuance of the Panel's report (S/2001/1015) the Ghanaian authorities officially confirmed that Bockarie visited Accra from 17 to 28 May 2001 and stayed at the Ebony Hotel, Dzorwulu, under the assumed name of Sam Johnson (see annex III). The Panel during its examination of flight manifests noted that in 2001 one Sam Johnson travelled between Accra and Monrovia a number of times. The Panel continues to obtain reports, including from an acquaintance of his, that Bockarie spends time in Accra.

46. In Liberia there are persistent rumours that Bockarie is playing a prominent role in recruiting for an independent militia to fight LURD.

47. Late in October and in November 2001 in Sierra Leone there was a recurrence of reports, albeit of questionable accuracy, that "Mosquito" was recruiting RUF to be mercenaries for Liberia. The Civil Defence Force reported late in December 2001 that Sam Bockarie was in the southern Liberian border town of Congo with a large number of men. The Government of Sierra Leone responded with a rapid deployment of forces along the border and authorized constant helicopter patrols, but could find no trace of him or his men. In January 2002 Bockarie was once more rumoured to be in Foya leading the fight against LURD and in February 2002 reported to be operating in Lofa County just across from Dia Chiefdom in Sierra Leone, rallying RUF troops to take up the fight.

48. In the first week of April 2002, units of the Republic of Sierra Leone Armed Forces in Buedu and Zimmi reported rumours that Bockarie was once more preparing men for a three-day cross-border campaign to destabilize the upcoming elections. They requested an impressive list of extra resources to deal with the perceived threat. The Panel visited Bockarie's former stronghold in Buedu and asked local chiefs if they had received news of his whereabouts. They said they had

not heard about him since early 2001 although some members of his family had recently returned home from a refugee camp in Guinea.

49. A LURD commander from Foya also told the Panel that their forces monitored "Mosquito" on their HF radio sets. According to General "Last Order", a LURD commander from the Foya area, several hundred ex-RUF fighters form part of an independent militia fighting in Lofa. Its base is Vahun but it is operational in Lofa County and is led by one "Mosquito". Under him is one Sweet Kenny (phonetic), and third in command is a Captain Solo (call sign "Red Bush 5"), both Sierra Leoneans. Guinean dissidents are also part of the militia, led by one Mama Tomo. The Guineans are distinguishable by their printed T-shirts. Commander Rowland Duo liaises with this militia but it takes its orders and falls under the authority of Liberia's Special Security Service Commander, Benjamin Yeaten.

50. The Panel has also heard of other ex-RUF combatants fighting in small groups for other Liberian militia and regular units. There does not seem to be any coherence among these groups and, except for the militia in Lofa, there is nothing particularly distinguishable about them other than as mercenaries.

51. Bockarie has entered regional mythology and verifiable sightings have proved impossible to obtain. This situation has not been helped by the inflation of "Mosquitos" in the Liberian conflict. There are at least three Liberian "Mosquitos" in addition to Bockarie. After rebel fighting in north-western Liberia in August 1999, a character calling himself "Mosquito Spray" telephoned the BBC to denounce President Charles Taylor. There are also Colonel Faso and General Vambo, both known as "Maskita" too, fighting for the Government of Liberia.

52. The Government of Liberia continues to deny to the Panel that it has any knowledge of the whereabouts of Sam Bockarie.

53. The Panel agrees that hard facts are few. It was able to confirm from the Sierra Leone Embassy in Monrovia and the Liberian National Security Advisor that Sam Bockarie's wife and mother still live in Monrovia in a house in the Twelve Houses area of Paynesville. According to the Sierra Leone Embassy they will shortly be returning to Sierra Leone.

54. The Panel concludes that the remnants of RUF resident in Liberia (sometimes referred to as the Independent RUF or RUF-I) pose no direct threat to the stability that has returned to Sierra Leone. The Panel could find no direct link between RUFP and those hardcore RUF that did not join disarmament and demobilization in Sierra Leone.

Mano River Union and ECOWAS engagement

The long-awaited meeting of the Mano River Union heads of State was hosted by Mohamed VI, King of Morocco, on 27 February 2002 in Rabat. The three presidents agreed to work together to end cross-border insurgencies and to "promote peace, understanding and good-neighbourliness".

Following this summit the Joint Security Committee met from 5 to 7 March 2002 in Freetown. A second meeting of the Committee was held

in Conakry on 25 March and a Committee of Legal Experts met on 13 March in Freetown.

At the Joint Security Committee meetings the problem of dissidents, the deployment of joint security and confidence-building units, proliferation of small arms and the need for intelligence-sharing were key issues discussed.

ECOWAS has also been engaged. It sponsored in March 2002 a conference in Abuja on political dialogue in Liberia which the Government of Liberia, civil society and opposition groups attended. The LURD rebels were invited but failed to attend claiming late receipt of the invitation.

The eighth ministerial meeting of the ECOWAS Mediation and Security Council was held in Dakar on 29 March 2002. The Minister examined the security situation in Liberia. At the end of the meeting, the Ministers condemned the LURD attacks in Liberia and declared a ban on travel to and residence within Member States for the LURD leadership. A committee was set up to monitor the enforcement of these measures, comprising Guinea, Liberia, Mali, Senegal and Sierra Leone and the ECOWAS secretariat.

II. Arms and air transportation

A. Arms

Introduction

55. There is little doubt that the Government of Liberia continues violating the arms embargo. Although the AFL soldiers on the streets in Monrovia and the armed young boys of different militia groups sometimes carry old rifles, members of the notorious militia called the ATU can be seen in the streets of Monrovia carrying new weapons. During its visit to Kakata, some 40 km north of Monrovia, the Panel witnessed the Government forces carrying guns and belts with brand new ammunition around their shoulders.

56. The Panel stressed in its previous reports (S/2000/1195 and S/2001/1015) the risks posed by great quantities of weapons floating around in the subregion. The Panel is pleased with the outcome of the disarmament and demobilization process that ended in Sierra Leone in January 2002. Over a period of three years (since September 1998) some 72,500 combatants disarmed in three different disarmament and demobilization phases, which were disrupted midway by the flaring-up of a conflict in May 2000. The number is far in excess of the original estimate of 45,000 combatants. Under the final third phase of disarmament and demobilization that commenced in May 2001, 19,183 RUF, 27,695 CDF and 198 others were disarmed.

57. In a subsequent Community Arms Collection and Destruction Programme, the Sierra Leone police collected arms that were not suitable for registration under the Disarmament and Demobilization Programme. Some 9,000 arms, mostly shotguns, were collected. Although these shotguns are usually single-barrelled weapons used

for hunting only, they could be lethal. During the collection exercise, small numbers of former RUF came forward with weapons.

58. The Sierra Leone police have also started cordon and search operations to remove remaining illegal arms from circulation. The Panel welcomes any such measures, as they will significantly reduce the risk of renewed hostilities. Localized violence does occur as has been reported in the recently liberated diamond areas around Kono and Tongo fields, but it poses little long-term risk.

Regional problem far from solved

59. The successful conduct of these disarmament exercises does not preclude the possibility that small arms are still in the possession of non-State actors, including former RUF. One indicator is the weapons captured from UNAMSIL forces by RUF. Those were all registered, and of the 629 weapons captured only 181 have been recovered through the disarmament process. There is no exact count of the weapons delivered to the Sierra Leone Army and ECOMOG that were captured by RUF. Many such weapons have not been returned and must therefore still be circulating in the region. They may be hidden in secret arms caches in Sierra Leone or may have been sold across the borders.

60. During discussion with the defence and law enforcement authorities in Côte d'Ivoire and Guinea the Panel learned that the proliferation of arms within these countries is a reality. The Panel was also informed that the Governments lack capacity for dealing with this problem. Such issues are primarily an internal policing problem for Guinea and Côte d'Ivoire, but they do contribute to the risk of violent outbreaks of conflict and organized banditry.

61. A related problem is the mushrooming growth of uncontrolled rebel groups and loosely controlled and underpaid army or police units in the subregion. The Panel received numerous accounts of arms and ammunition being sold or bartered away by hungry or unpaid military or police personnel. These units show little loyalty to the groups they are fighting for and they change sides whenever they see an opportunity that might benefit them.

Positive developments on the international level

62. Since the issuance of its last report (S/2001/1015), the Panel has received communications from many Member States about their efforts to curtail the smuggling of conflict diamonds and the proliferation of arms in West Africa. The Panel wishes to highlight the responses from the Governments of Belgium, Guinea and Slovakia.

63. On 5 March 2002 the Permanent Mission of Belgium to the United Nations reported that an international arrest warrant had been issued against Viktor Bout. Bout is accused of money-laundering and criminal conspiracy. Sanjivan Ruprah, also a key figure in the Panel's report, was arrested in Belgium on 7 February 2002 along with Carlos "Beto" Laplaine. The involvement of Ruprah and Laplaine in illegal arms trafficking to Liberia in violation of the arms embargo was described in detail in the report.

64. The Permanent Mission of Guinea to the United Nations reported on 24 March 2002 to the Panel that an investigation in Guinea, subsequent to the publication of the report of the Panel, had led to the official removal on 30 November 2001 of the

company Pecos from the register of corporations. The Panel described the activities of Pecos as a supplier of false end-user certificates (see S/2001/1015, paras. 253-267).

65. The Permanent Mission of Slovakia to the United Nations reported that in December 2001 criminal charges had been brought against Alexander Islamov for his role in the illegal sale of arms. The Panel had reported that Islamov facilitated the supply of helicopter spare parts and helicopters from Kyrgyzstan. His role was also highlighted in several other arms shipments. Slovakia also arrested Peter Jusko. Both individuals are being prosecuted in connection with their involvement in the sale of one Mi-35 helicopter gunship to Liberia and the attempted sale of a second one. Slovakia also adopted new legislation fine-tuning the law on trade with military materiel in December 2001 in order to eliminate the risk of further attempts to violate the sanctions regimes by individuals or business entities in Slovakia.

66. The Panel views these measures taken by individual Member States as significant steps in the monitoring of sanctions. The Panel once again interviewed Mohamed Yansane in Guinea. Yansane had set up the Pecos company in Guinea that was used by Jusko, Islamov, Bout and others to create forged end-user certificates. After Jusko was released on bail, Yansane told the Panel that he kept receiving telephone calls from Jusko, who wanted to send people to buy diamonds. This continues to show a close link between arms trafficking and diamond deals. The Panel passed on this information to the authorities in Guinea and in Slovakia for further investigation.

Recommendations on arms

67. The continuing availability of unregistered arms in the Mano River Union countries and their neighbours has to be dealt with. The Panel is concerned about fresh reports of weapons being brought into the region from abroad.

68. The Panel, in its previous reports (S/2000/1195 and S/2001/1015) emphasized the need to have a more thorough implementation of the ECOWAS Moratorium on the Importation, Exportation and Manufacture of Small Arms and Light Weapons in West Africa. The Panel once again recommends that, for reasons of transparency and confidence-building, the existing Moratorium be broadened to an information exchange mechanism for all types of weapon procured by the ECOWAS member States.

69. The Panel also reiterates its recommendation that the information exchange should be binding on both the suppliers and the receiving States and that they should report every arms transaction to the newly established mechanism, including data on the names and companies of the brokers and transport agents.

70. The Panel reiterates its recommendation that all arms-producing and exporting countries abstain from supplying weapons to countries of the Mano River Union.

71. The Panel reiterates its recommendation that the arms embargo on Liberia should continue.

72. The Panel once again strongly recommends an immediate and complete embargo on all non-State actors in the Mano River Union countries, including the dissident groups constituting LURD.

B. Air transportation

The establishment of a new aviation registry

73. Liberia has established a new aviation registry in cooperation with ICAO and in conformity with its international procedures.[1] Aircraft registered in Liberia will now carry tail numbers with the prefix "A8" instead of "EL".

Management of airspace

74. Liberia decided to take over the operation of its own airspace, which had been controlled from Conakry, where the Area Control Centre of the Flight Information Region (Roberts FIR) is located.[2] Eventually Liberia wanted its airspace to be controlled exclusively by Liberian nationals. This needed to be done, Liberia felt, for reasons of national security. It should be noted that this decision was taken shortly after the Panel of Experts on Sierra Leone had issued its report (S/2000/1195). Some of the Panel's investigations on arms smuggling had relied on flight information from different flight information regions in Africa to identify planes landing in Monrovia, as the Liberian authorities had not provided such a list.

75. Since every State has the right to control its own airspace under the Chicago Convention on International Civil Aviation, the Panel does not think the issue should be subject to any sanctions. A letter of agreement was signed on 22 November 2001 between the Roberts Area Control Centre in Conakry and the Approach Control Unit of Roberts International Airport. The letter of agreement describes the precise modalities of responsibility of the two Centres but the agreement does not degrade the integrity of the Roberts FIR. For the future monitoring of aircraft movements to and from Monrovia, information can still be obtained from the different flight information regions in West Africa and elsewhere.

Recommendations on air transportation

76. The Panel reiterates the recommendations made on air transportation in its previous report (S/2001/1015).

C. The crash-landing of an aircraft on 15 February 2002

77. On 15 February 2002, an aircraft crashed as it approached the runway of Roberts International Airport. International media reported a series of explosions after the crash that could have been caused by the presence on board of arms and ammunition. The Panel tried to find out more about the crash, especially in the light of the arms embargo on Liberia, but the Government authorities have thus far steadfastly prevented any independent observer from going to the site.

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[1] Chicago Convention on International Civil Aviation, annex 7 (Aircraft Nationality and Registration Marks).

[2] Roberts FIR covers the sovereign airspaces of Guinea, Liberia and Sierra Leone. When the Flight Information Region was founded in 1975 the Flight Information Centre was located at the airport of Robertsfield. Because of the war in Liberia and later in Sierra Leone the Centre was transferred to Freetown and later to Conakry in Guinea, where it is still based today. The international airport of Monrovia is Roberts International Airport. In the Roberts FIR, the airports of Conakry, Freetown and Roberts all dispose of their own so-called approach (APP) zone, that is, their territorial airspace, which falls under their responsibility.

78. Immediately after the accident happened, the Ministry of Information in Liberia reported that an Antonov 12 had crashed at 5 a.m. The crew had sought emergency landing permission while flying over Liberian territory. From the official press release it appears that the aircraft was not actually meant to land in Monrovia but was flying elsewhere, crossing Liberian airspace (see annex IV).

79. The Panel's reconstruction of the facts, based on information collected from several flight information regions in Africa and certain States in other regions, clearly contradicts the official statement of the Government of Liberia.

80. On 12 February 2002, the Directorate of Civil Aviation of Chad issued a request for overflight to the civil aviation authorities of Nigeria, Togo, Benin, Côte d'Ivoire and Liberia for a flight landing in Monrovia. The message that was sent from Chad contains the following facts:

- Aircraft type: An 12.
- Registration: ER-ADL (this is the tail number and shows that the plane was registered in the Republic of Moldova).
- Operating agency: Inter Trans Congo.
- Charterer: Government of Chad.
- Object: Transport of VIPs.
- Route: N'Djamena-Monrovia.
- Date: 13 February 2002.

81. Liberia received this overflight and landing request on 13 February 2002 and gave permission for the flight on the same day through its Civil Aviation Authority. The aircraft finally left N'Djamena on 15 February 2002 for Monrovia, where it was supposed to land at around 6 a.m., with 10 passengers on board. The Panel interviewed the air traffic controller on duty in Monrovia. Apart from reduced visibility due to fog (visibility only 500 m) the pilot did not, at any moment, mention any technical problem to the control tower. The pilot was following the instructions of the controller and was approaching the runway, when the controller suddenly lost contact with the aircraft and saw a light flash at some distance from the beginning of the runway. This was the accident and the control tower immediately notified the fire service of the airport. During the interview with the air traffic controller the Director of Civil Aviation was present in the room.

82. Further discussions with the Liberian authorities regarding the accident did not add much to this. Meetings and telephonic conversations with the Minister of Transport, his deputy, the Director of Civil Aviation, the Commissioner of Immigration, the Chief of Protocol of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Minister of Defence and the Director of the airport added the following:

- One person was killed and nine others were wounded in the crash.
- The airport fire service intervened very quickly.
- The aircraft was totally destroyed.
- All documents on board were destroyed.
- The wounded were evacuated and taken to a private hospital.

- There was no black box on board.
- Since there were no appropriate aeronautical means of telecommunication available, the Director of Civil Aviation sent, by e-mail, a notification of the accident to the Republic of Moldova (the State of registration), to Chad (the charterer), to the Russian Federation (the manufacturer of the plane) and to ICAO, partly confirming the information about the flight as reconstructed independently by the Panel.
- The country of the operator of the aircraft (Inter Trans Congo) was not notified.
- A commission of inquiry was established to investigate the accident.

A web of contradictions

83. The Panel noted many contradictions with respect to this accident. The interviews with the Liberian authorities were conducted from 2 to 5 April 2002. This is more than 45 days after the accident occurred. Until then, according to the Liberian authorities, no response had been received from the above-mentioned concerned States, as would be the procedure under ICAO regulations. In addition, none of the States whose citizens were among those killed or wounded in the crash has responded. None of the authorities was able to give the Panel a list of the names or nationalities of the people on board.

84. Not a single document relating to the crash was given to the Panel despite an official request to the Minister of Transport, who had promised to supply the Panel with any information requested. According to the authorities no pictures were taken of the aircraft and there was no tape recording of the conversation between the pilot and the control tower.

85. Despite many assurances, and authorization by the Minister of Defence, the Panel was never allowed to visit the site where the accident had occurred. Whenever the Panel wanted to proceed to the site, the authorities always created another hurdle. Finally, on the day of its departure from Liberia, arrangements were made for the Panel to visit the site with the Director of Civil Aviation. But all of a sudden the site became a "no-go area" because of the "presence" of dissident fighters in the area. The Panel enquired of commercial companies and diplomatic missions whether they had been informed about any insecurity in the direct vicinity of the airport but nothing of the sort had happened.

86. Despite the fact that the crash site was close to the runway of Roberts International Airport, the aviation authorities issued no Notice to Airmen warning users of the airport of any such dissident threat. Three members of the Panel departed from the very same airport a few hours after they had been prevented from visiting the crash site for security reasons. While passing through the airport, the Panel noticed no extra security. At the time of take-off, the Panel saw the wrecked aircraft from the air, very close to Roberts Airport perimeter fence, where a track passed by. A cockpit and tail were clearly visible, but not the fuselage or the wings. The whole site appeared to have been covered by soil, giving the site, from the air, a clean yellow-reddish colour, although some of the trees and vegetation around it appeared burnt. From the air, there was no sign of any military or indeed human activity anywhere near the crash site.

87. According to the request for overflight and landing, the flight was a VIP flight. An Antonov 12 is generally known as a cargo transport aircraft and it is highly unlikely that it would be carrying any VIPs at such an hour. Multiple credible eyewitness accounts obtained by the Panel referred to the sound of what seemed like gunfire for hours after the crash. Even at the Firestone Plantation, which is miles away from the airport, people thought that the airport was under attack.

88. The Panel asked for a copy of the "accident notification" required under the Chicago Convention on International Civil Aviation Organization,[3] but the Director of Civil Aviation did not provide this document and he told the Panel he had not yet started to draft his report.

89. Another Antonov 12, with Moldovan registration ER-ACZ, operated by the same operator and chartered again by the Government of Chad, landed in Monrovia on 25 February 2002 and left the next day. When the Panel asked the Liberian authorities to produce the landing permission for that flight, the Director of Civil Aviation told the Panel he was not aware of any such flight.

What are the Liberian authorities hiding?

90. There are several additional anomalies connected with both these flights. The registration numbers ER-ADL and ER-ACZ do not exist. Or do they? The Panel contacted the Civil Aviation Authority of the Republic of Moldova, where "ER-" aircraft should be registered. According to the Director of Civil Aviation in Chisinau, a company in Moldova operated the aircraft, until June 2001. Since then the aircraft had been deregistered (see annex V) and officially no new operator or owner is known. The Panel cross-checked this with an aviation industry database and found confirmation of the "pending" status of both the aircraft. The Panel also called Tiramavia, the company that had operated both the aircraft in Moldova. It had not heard about any crash of its aircraft, nor did they acknowledge that they were currently operating any of those aircraft. Later telephone calls by the Panel to Tiramavia Company were not answered.

91. The Panel also received, from a company in Togo that leased the aircraft, certificates of registration issued by the State Administration of Civil Aviation of the Republic of Moldova for both these aircraft. They were issued on the same day as the deregistration documents and the company also sent the Panel copies of the insurance for the aircraft and an airworthiness certificate (annex VI), issued on the day the aircraft were deregistered. These documents show Tiramavia Company in Moldova as the operating agency for the aircraft, and the owners as SABAA Tours and Travels Agency, a firm in Fujairah, in the United Arab Emirates.

92. Thus the aircraft were both deregistered and registered in Moldova on the same day. Clearly, one of these documents — deregistration or registration — must be false.

93. Fraudulent aircraft registration numbers and the use of non-existent airline companies for arms trafficking purposes have been dealt with extensively in previous reports of the Panel (S/2000/1195 and S/2001/1015). Inter Trans Congo, the company mentioned as the operator of the aircraft on the overflight requests received by West African traffic controllers, seems not to exist. Enquiries were sent

[3] Annex 13, chapter 4.

by the Panel to the authorities of both the Democratic Republic of the Congo and the Republic of the Congo as to the existence of this company. Only the authorities of the Democratic Republic of the Congo responded, saying that no such company was registered. No response was received from the Republic of the Congo.

94. There is also a problem with the route followed by the aircraft. Having sent a response to a letter several West African countries, the Panel received a response from Togo. A request from a company called Africa West was issued through the Civil Aviation Authority in Togo for permission for a flight, between 24 and 26 February 2002, from Lomé to Brazzaville, then to Malabo, and back. The document mentions a cargo consisting of "supplies" and also mentions that an Antonov 12 registered as ER-ACZ would perform the flight. But the Panel contacted the Operations Manager of the company Africa West, who said that, in the end, another Antonov 12 with registration number ER-ACL was used. The company supplied the Panel with computer records of the flight movements of the aircraft, showing that the company was not aware of the flights that had been conducted between N'Djamena and Monrovia. Instead the records showed flight movements between Lomé, Brazzaville, Pointe Noire, Cotonou, Abidjan and Malabo.

95. The Panel knows that the ER-ACZ registered aircraft did go to N'Djamena and made a flight to Liberia, where it arrived at Roberts International Airport on 25 February 2002. A request for overflight and landing was issued only when the aircraft was already in the air. It must have crossed the airspace of several other countries, but none of them received any notification or request, except for the original request showing a route to Malabo and Brazzaville.

96. As mentioned above, the Director of Civil Aviation in Liberia also received no request for overflight and landing, but the aircraft did receive guidance from the control tower at Roberts International Airport. The Panel asked the Commissioner of Immigration of Liberia, John Enrique Smythe, for a list of the passengers or crew of the aircraft, but no information was given. The Panel did establish that the aircraft was refuelled the next day, 26 February, and left Monrovia on that day.

97. During its short assessment mission, the Panel could not establish the full extent of the events surrounding these suspicious flights to Monrovia. Especially the cargo on board the aircraft remains a mystery. The second aircraft took the same route, N'Djamena-Monrovia, as the one that crashed and that the Panel was prevented from seeing.

98. The Panel is also aware of a third flight, of an aircraft carrying a similar registration number, ER-ACL. The Panel knows only that the aircraft landed at Roberts International Airport on 5 March 2002. It was also refuelled there and took off again on 6 March 2002. The Roberts Flight Information Region in Conakry was not informed about this flight.

99. Fraudulent registration of the aircraft, the lack of an official overflight or landing request for the ER-ACZ in Liberia, the fact that other countries have not recorded any of these aircraft crossing their airspace and the irregularities with regard to the flight plans are the facts that have been established so far.

Recommendations

100. On a short assessment mission, the Panel was not in a position to investigate these mysterious flights any further. However, given the clear anomalies and the

secrecy of the Government of Liberia with respect to these flights, the Panel would recommend that Liberia be requested to supply to the Security Council Committee, within three months, a full report on:

- Basic facts about the crash, including pictures of the wrecked aircraft and the crash site.
- The nature of the flights from and to N'Djamena on 15 February, 25 February and 5 March 2002.
- The irregularities involved with the registration and flight plans of the flights with registration numbers ER-ADL, ER-ACZ and ER-ACL.
- A full list of the crew, the pilots and the cargo on board these flights.
- The flight plans for these flights.
- The contract showing the consignee of these flights.
- The fuel manifests for all these flights.
- The payments made for these flights.

101. The Panel further recommends that, in order to verify the findings of that report, an independent investigation should be conducted.

III. Diamonds and the region

A. Diamond embargo on Liberia

102. Sanctions were imposed on the export of Liberian rough diamonds after the Panel presented its conclusions. The report (S/2000/1195) illustrated how diamonds far in the excess of the quality and quantity available in Liberia had been imported into Belgium. Most of those diamonds were illicit diamonds from other countries, taking advantage of Liberia's involvement in the illicit diamond trade. This trade provided Liberia with convenient cover for the export of conflict diamonds from Sierra Leone.

103. The imposition of an embargo on the export of Liberian rough, coupled with continued progress in the Sierra Leone peace process, has resulted in "Liberian"-labelled rough disappearing from the official markets. No imports from Liberia have been recorded in Antwerp, Belgium being the only country providing statistics on imports. Since the imposition of the sanctions no official exports have been recorded from Liberia by its Central Bank or its Ministry of Finance.

104. All diamond dealers' licence and export permits were suspended on 7 May 2001. No dealer's licence has been renewed for 2002 and there has been a steep decline in the registration of alluvial mining claims. On 23 October 2001 the Ministers of Finance and Lands, Mines and Energy issued a joint administrative notice, which was published in the Liberian press on 27 November 2001, calling for continued strict adherence to the United Nations resolution and calling on dealers' offices to remain open to avoid crisis in the industry. The Ministry also suspended the dealers' licence fees from 1 July to 31 December 2001 to encourage the dealers to remain operative.

105. The Ministers of Finance and Lands, Mines and Energy issued a second memorandum on 6 March 2002, once more calling for strict adherence to the United Nations sanction; calling for all registered dealers to remain open and suspending the issuance of licences for the period from 2 January to 31 December 2002 or until such time as the sanction is lifted.

106. There are in 2002 three registered diamond dealers in Liberia:

- Mars Diamonds
- Empire Diamonds
- Diandorra Minerals

107. In 2002 only five registered diamond brokers are left; seven others have closed down because of lack of business, although one of these has transferred to dealing in alluvial gold.

108. The Government in May 2001 placed mineral inspectors in the buying offices in Monrovia to monitor and keep a record of daily diamond purchases on the internal market. The inspectors were also there to ensure that the diamonds were bought only from legitimate buyers or brokers. According to the Government the inspectors were withdrawn late in 2001 because there was no diamond trade to monitor.

109. In its report (S/2001/1015) the Panel of Experts reported that the artisanal trade in rough diamonds had been affected by the embargo, creating additional hardship for those who seek to make a living in this sector; because of improved world prices, they had increasingly shifted to artisanal gold production. Figures for the export of alluvial gold from Liberia show a rise in production, from 5.36 ounces ($1,317.93) in October 2001 to 192.90 ounces ($41,642.19) in January 2002. The Government claims that there are some 60,000 miners in the alluvial diamond sector, others in the industry estimated that some 20,000 to 30,000 people in the rural areas are dependent on the trade.

110. Commercial and artisanal production of alluvial diamonds, such as that of the Smith Camp Mining Agency and the Weasua Mining District, has been badly affected by the upsurge of fighting in western Liberia. The Ministry of Lands, Mines and Energy reported that the prevailing war in western Liberia has brought mining activities to a complete halt, which has led to a 50 per cent decline in revenue generation from mining activities. At least 12 mining districts have been attacked or occupied by LURD rebels and several eyewitnesses spoke of having to wash unprocessed gravel to extract diamonds for the rebels. Although LURD officials denied to the Panel that they are engaged in the diamond business, such "conflict diamonds" are likely to be smuggled through Guinea and Sierra Leone. A rebel LURD commander interviewed by the Panel also admitted that rebel soldiers seized diamonds during their operations and had sold them to buyers in Guinea.

111. In its report the Panel of Experts reported that, since it is impossible to sell Liberian rough officially, dealers and brokers were seeking to disguise their Liberian diamonds as diamonds from neighbouring countries. The Liberian Minister of Lands, Mines and Energy reported that three Liberian dealers had opened buying offices in Sierra Leone, which also bought smuggled Liberian rough. The Panel was aware of one such office in Bo and had visited it in September 2001. The dealer at that time admitted to trading in Liberian rough. When the Panel revisited this buying

office in Bo in March 2002 it was told that the last purchase was in November 2001 and that the decline in the Liberian trade was due to low prices for Liberian gemstones and the disruption to quality production, such as that from Weasua, caused by the war inside Liberia.

112. The Panel was also told by the European Union of four dealers in Abidjan that had become specialists in laundering Liberian rough since the diamond embargo entered into force. The Panel had already confirmed that two dealers operated through the Hotel Ivoire in Abidjan, using a Lebanese middleman who carried the parcels from Monrovia. These dealers continued to buy from Liberia. Sanjivan Ruprah also told the Panel that he had an office in Abidjan where Issa Sessay, the interim leader of the RUF Party, through a middleman had come to offer great quantities of diamonds late in 2001. Independently, another diamond dealer said he had heard about Sessay's selling attempts through Abidjan and he mentioned exactly the same amount of diamonds, 8,000 carats. Neither of these two sources knew who had actually bought the diamonds. Other former RUF leaders, such as Gibril Massaquoi, are also active in the diamond trade but these commercial activities serve the interests of the individuals themselves, rather than RUF or its follow-up political party.

113. The Panel reported (see S/2000/1195 and S/2001/1015) on so-called "Gambian" diamonds as an issue of concern. The Gambia, a non-producing country, continues to feature prominently as the initial destination for smuggled diamonds. The Government of Sierra Leone voiced frustration about the level of smuggling to the Gambia. The Panel also established that the Chairman of the Diamond Dealers of Liberia, Mohamed Shour, is based in the Gambia and maintains a network of buying offices run by his family in Sierra Leone (he has an export licence as Sima Stars, which exported 13,411.47 carats from Sierra Leone in January and February 2002) and he is a registered diamond dealer in Liberia (Mars Diamond Company).

114. The Gambian authorities have insisted that they have never had any record of an official diamond transaction through the Gambia or a smuggling incident on its territory. In 2002 for the first time the authorities arrested two diamond smugglers. The Panel learned this from sources within the diamond industry, but could not independently confirm it.

115. The Panel of Experts continued to hear uncorroborated stories about President Taylor and his family taking an active interest in and benefiting from the diamond trade. The Minister of Lands, Mines and Energy reported that in the recent past the President heard of a 26-carat stone from Lofa County and insisted that the mine inspectors locate it for him. It was the President who ordered the suspension of the assistant and vice-ministers in the Ministry of Lands, Mines and Energy after a Japanese national, Tatsunari Uchida, who is president of the Tokyo-based Kinshodo Co. Ltd, a diamond import and export company, was arrested on 21 November 2001 for attempted diamond smuggling and possession of $135,000 in undeclared cash. He was deported from Liberia on 5 December 2001.

116. The Panel obtained more details about the dealings of President Taylor and the sale of RUF diamonds through Monrovia until, at least, early 2001. Hotel Boulevard, a hotel in the heart of Monrovia, served as the most important meeting place for businessmen who came to deal in diamonds or arms. One of its customers was Sanjivan Ruprah, who stayed in Hotel Boulevard before he moved to a more permanent residence in Monrovia in the house of the late Police Commissioner Joe

Tate. The Panel describes in detail (S/2001/1015) how Ruprah was acting on behalf of both Viktor Bout and the Liberian Bureau of Maritime Affairs. A letter the Panel obtained during its latest trip to Liberia shows how Ruprah also paid for the accommodation of pilots of an aircraft that was used for the transportation of the President. Ruprah, apart from being involved in violating the arms embargo, is mainly a diamond dealer.

117. The Panel also interviewed Samih Ossailly, a Sierra Leone-born Lebanese who worked closely with Ibrahim Bah and is living in Belgium. Both stayed on many occasions in Hotel Boulevard where their rooms were turned into diamond buying offices. Bah, who was a key middleman between RUF and Liberia, was exporting through a company called Greenstone Diamonds. Other diamond dealers were based there as well and it is there that RUF commanders and representatives of President Taylor set up their negotiations of diamonds and arms deals and where international buyers came to buy them for export. Many of these wrote in the hotel register that they were guests in Liberia of the Government. Several eyewitnesses, including hotel staff, confirmed this to the Panel and acknowledged that many of the dealers were picked up by government vehicles, including vehicles from the Presidential mansion. The Panel has no knowledge of any recent dealings in Hotel Boulevard. The Hotel was closed for several months and was reopened only on 1 March 2002. It is now called Hotel Royal.

118. According to Samih Ossailly, Ibrahim Bah travels a great deal, and telephoned him regularly from Togo in March 2002, but shortly thereafter moved to another country. Bah had been based in Burkina Faso and in December 2001 was interviewed in Ouagadougou by a United States diplomat. The Panel obtained telephone numbers for Bah and, through a middleman, requested an interview but did not succeed in speaking to him.

B. Certificate of origin schemes

Background

119. Sierra Leone and Guinea have now fully implemented the certificate of origin schemes and, since RUF has been officially disbanded, by definition the problem of conflict diamonds is now solved. The problem of the illicit sale of diamonds however remains. A recent study of Sierra Leone's diamond industry by the United Kingdom Department for International Development concluded that in this industry corruption had its "most deleterious effect" and that dealing with this is a key challenge.

Sierra Leone

120. There have been three "90-day" reviews of the certificate of origin scheme established by the Government of Sierra Leone in compliance with paragraph 2 of Security Council resolution 1306 (2000). The first and second reviews were issued as documents S/2000/1151 of 4 December 2000 and S/2001/794 of 16 August 2001. The Government of Sierra Leone made a third submission (see S/2002/38) to the Chairman of the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1132 (1997) prior to the informal consultations of the Security Council on 13 December on the ban on illegal trade in Sierra Leone diamonds. On 19 December

2001, the Council adopted resolution 1385 (2001), extending the ban for a further 12 months from 5 January 2002.

121. Since the certificate of origin scheme became operational, 252,132 carats of rough and uncut diamonds valued at $30.52 million have been exported to various markets in the world, such as Belgium, Israel, the United Kingdom and the United States.

122. The Government reports that the system continues to work well. The volume of exports continues to increase although the quality of stones entering the system has declined. By 1 January 2002 Sierra Leone had issued 184 certificates of origin and all corresponding import information had been returned to the Government Gold and Diamond Office. Digital photographs of rough and uncut diamonds for valuation and export are transmitted electronically with the information contained in the original certificate of origin. The Sierra Leone Ministry of Mineral Resources reported that Belgium and Israel had responded to their information but other importing countries had not.

123. The Independent Diamond Valuator and his assistant also work closely with the Government Gold and Diamond Office and no major differences in valuation or quality of identification were reported to the Panel. Crucial to the success of the certification process is the monitoring of mining and trading activities in the country. This is conducted by mines monitoring officers, although interviews with such officers in Kenama indicated they were poorly paid or not paid at all, lacked mobility and were prone to financial inducement. Three persons were arrested for unlawful possession of diamonds in recent months. A total of 140 carats valued at $20,000 were confiscated and the culprits fined. The Anti-Corruption Commission in Freetown also recently moved against one senior government official for diamond smuggling, but there are many more widely talked about offenders.

Table 1
Diamond exports: comparative figures for January and February, 2001 and 2002

	2001			*2002*		
	Carats	*Value (United States dollars)*	*Price per carat*	*Carats*	*Value (United States dollars)*	*Price per carat*
January	13 486.10	1 991 773.84	147.69	20 890.75	1 436 569.50	68.77
February	15 384.67	1 909 276.29	124.10	16 988.55	1 782 848.73	104.94
Total	**28 870.77**	**3 901 050.13**	**135.12**	**37 879.30**	**3 219 418.23**	**84.99**

Source: Government Gold and Diamond Office, Sierra Leone.

Table 2
Diamond exports, September 2001 to February 2002

	Total carats	*Value (United States dollars)*
September 2001	29 706.68	2 194 349.36
October 2001	24 097.92	2 488 455.56
November 2001	21 358.88	2 152 522.95
December 2001	16 669.34	2 032 708.34
January 2002	20 890.75	1 436 569.50
February 2002	16 988.55	1 782 848.73

Source: Government Gold and Diamond Office, Sierra Leone.

Restoring State control over diamond areas

124. Although RUF has ceased to exist as an armed entity, it has continued to try as a political one to maintain a grip on diamond production from the Kono and Tongo diamond fields. Although the deployment of the Sierra Leone Army in October 2001 did not immediately challenge the RUF grip on the trade, violence erupted on 19 December 2001 following a dispute over an agreement to stop mining in Koidu. This led to rioting and deaths. It seems probable that the vociferous support for the banning of mining in the town was a short-term measure to dislodge the vested interests of RUF in the trade. By 4 January 2002 a joint statement of intent to stop mining in Koidu town was reached and there has only been one reported incidence of mining in the town since.

125. There has been less progress in the Tongo fields. RUF held out longer against disarmament there but finally bowed to grass-roots pressure early in January 2002. Mining continues in Tongo and UNAMSIL officials admitted they preferred to turn a blind eye, since the attractions of mining in the area seemed to have transcended all factors, including mutual antipathy between former warring factions. In February 2002, UNAMSIL feared there might be an outbreak of violence in the Tongo fields similar to that in Koidu following their occupation by 200 members of a youth group, allegedly backed by remnants of CDF. Effective and fair handling of this by the local authorities avoided any conflict.

Guinea

126. Guinea followed Sierra Leone and in June 2001 introduced a certificate of origin scheme, which is controlled by the centralized Bureau national d'expertise de diamants et autres gemmes. According to the annual report of the Minister of Mines, Geology and Environment in 2001, Guinea exported 363,883 carats, valued at $23,681,860. The authorities however complain that since they introduced the certificate of origin scheme the quality of the stones entering their system has declined, contributing to a decline from $129.84 per carat in 2000 to $65.08 in 2001. They also blame the collapse of international prices, and the effect of the events of 11 September 2001 on the consumer markets, for contributing to this decline.

127. In Guinea the Mining Ministry and the Police and Defence authorities provided the Panel with details of a recent case showing how the black market in

diamonds continues to affect the economy. Guinea has a special fraud brigade that operates as an inter-agency body. Surveillance teams inspect suspicious activities in the major diamond trading centres, at ports, airports or in the major hotels. Early in December 2001 they watched two Ukrainians who were involved in efforts to buy diamonds, but those negotiations were abruptly ended. When the Ukrainians were passing through the Conakry airport to depart, customs inspected them and found a small quantity of diamonds on them. These diamonds were undeclared and the Ukrainians offered a bribe of $10,000 to be allowed to continue. The offer of such a large bribe raised suspicions further and an additional inspection of their luggage produced $1.5 million in cash which when examined by the Central Bank was discovered to be counterfeit.

128. The Ukrainians were then arrested and taken into custody. During their interrogation they said they obtained the money from a third person in Conakry, and that it was to have been used as a down payment for the purchase of diamonds. While they were negotiating to buy diamonds, their interlocutors had refused their dollars and had verified that they were counterfeit. They had wanted to take the money to Moscow, from where they received orders from an unidentified man called Serguei. The diamonds they were carrying were from Kenema in Sierra Leone and had been smuggled to Guinea, they claimed. The investigation is continuing and Guinea has sought cooperation and assistance from Interpol.

129. The Panel welcomed these operations by the Guinean authorities. This showed a commitment by Guinea to deal with diamond smuggling, the very problem that had enabled rebels in Sierra Leone to wage their brutal war for many years. Such arrests, as with the arrests of those violating the arms embargoes, create a deterrent and make trafficking operations riskier and costlier for the traffickers. The fact that counterfeit dollars and smuggling were involved shows the necessity to match the introduction of a certificate of origin scheme with thorough inspections and investigations into diamond smuggling. This case shows the magnitude of the problem. It not only involves dealings in diamonds by rebel groups but also tax evasion, money-laundering and other criminal activities on an international scale.

Liberia

130. The Ministry of Lands, Mines and Energy has remained committed to establishing a credible diamond certification system. The Ministry has produced a draft certificate of origin (annex VII) and has sought assistance from the United Kingdom Government, the European Union and the High Diamond Council. The Minister of Lands, Mines and Energy met the Director for International Affairs of HRD early in January 2002 to request technical assistance to draw up a road map that the Government of Liberia might present to the Security Council for its approval so as to enable Liberia to establish its own credible scheme. Liberia wishes to draw up a protocol with HRD for such technical support.

131. The Government wishes to open a one-stop diamond export centre. This would work through a four-stage export process:

- The Inspectorate at the Ministry of Lands, Mines and Energy would check and verify export licences, weigh and photograph the diamonds for export and attest to the receipt of the parcel for shipment.

- These would then be passed on to an appraiser to determine the quality (gem or industrial) and the value in carats and United States dollars.
- This would then be assessed by the Central Bank of Liberia for taxes and royalties and the Central Bank would serve as the custodian of the parcel that was to be shipped.
- The Customs department at the Ministry of Finance would verify all shipment documents and affix a customs seal and the parcel would then be approved for export.

132. The Government of Liberia has proposed that this one-stop export centre should be located either at the Central Bank of Liberia or at the Ministry of Lands, Mines and Energy.

133. The Government of Liberia has participated in Kimberly Process meetings. The Minister of Lands, Mines and Energy most recently obtained a travel exemption from the United Nations to attend the London meeting in September 2001. Since then the United Nations travel ban and lack of finance has discouraged any additional participation. However, the Government indicated that it would support the General Assembly draft resolution submitted by Member States participating in the Kimberly Process. On 11 March 2002 the Minister of Lands, Mines and Energy, Jenkins Dunbar, wrote to the Foreign Minister asking him to inform the Liberian Mission to the United Nations that the draft resolution should be signed and adopted (see General Assembly resolution 56/263 of 13 March 2002).

134. Liberia's own official exports of diamonds in 1999 were valued at $900,000, only 10 to 15 per cent of what is actually leaving the country according to the Ministry of Lands, Mines and Energy. In 2000, 22,112 carats were exported and there continued to be a rush to export diamonds prior to the imposition of sanctions in May 2001. Diamond specialists in Belgium and the United Kingdom believe that Liberia's true artisanal and commercial production is between $10 million and $15 million per year and easily identifiable. Any dramatic rise above this level of exports should raise the alarm that the Liberia label is once more being used to launder non-Liberian diamonds.

Côte d'Ivoire

135. Although Côte d'Ivoire has participated in some of the Kimberly Process meetings it has not yet implemented a certificate of origin regime and there is an urgent need for a review of its mining code. Currently, parcels exported from Côte d'Ivoire are accompanied by a document that is delivered after the inspection of each parcel by the Government's specialists. This document is not the same as a certificate of origin. Ivorian authorities claim that they lack the resources to afford the printing of such certificates and to install the hardware and software needed for feedback from transit and importing countries. The Ivorians claimed that they would be more engaged in the Kimberly Process if sponsorship were available.

C. Recommendation on diamonds

136. The diamond embargo on Liberia has contributed to the dramatic decline in the misuse of the Liberian label for diamond smuggling. The embargo has, however, reversed the problem, in effect, with continued smuggling of Liberian rough out of

the country and into neighbouring certification systems. If these certification schemes are to be credible, this situation needs to be dealt with urgently. Liberia should have its own credible certification scheme so that there is less incentive for Liberian rough to be deliberately mixed with rough of neighbouring countries.

137. Any dramatic increase in exports from Liberia could act as an early warning that the Liberian label is once more being used to launder non-Liberian diamonds. The Panel encourages the Government of Liberia to put in place a credible and transparent certification scheme which is independently audited by an internationally recognized audit company. This scheme should be independently assessed as credible and effective so as to facilitate the consideration of a monitored suspension of the diamond ban by the Security Council.

IV. Other sources of revenue and government expenditure

A. Background

138. The budget for the fiscal year 2001/2002 (July to June) was submitted late to Parliament, towards the end of November 2001, and adopted on 20 December 2001. The budget forecast expenditure of $92 million, a decrease of some 9.5 per cent over the previous year. According to the Government and IMF, spending on defence takes up about half of income and, following a decision to reduce civil service wage arrears from 10 months to 4, non-wage domestic arrears continued to accumulate. On 18 October 2001 President Taylor claimed that his Government had spent $25 million on the war in Lofa County.

139. According to IMF following its Article 4 assessment mission in December 2001 to Liberia, "Governance problems pervade Liberia's financial administration. Budgeting has become dysfunctional, tax incentives for large projects are granted on an ad hoc basis, the procurement system is weak, there are no apparent rules of oversight for purchases by the military ... there is little or no independent oversight of government operations". The Panel itself saw that the Auditor General's office was largely unfunded, unable to function while other government offices enjoyed support. Tax exemptions to concession holders were worth $2.5 million in 2001 according to government figures.

140. In December 2001 the European Union initiated consultations under article 96 of the Cotonou Agreement following its decision in June 2001 to suspend its aid, totalling $42 million, because of "worsening conditions" in the country. Article 96 allows for a consultation period of 60 days with a recipient country. Among the European Union's demands was that the Government of Liberia submit to a financial audit of its public finances. The Government consented just before the expiration of the two-month deadline given by the European Union.

141. The independent management and administrative audit is of selected government public and parastatal institutions. The aim of this European Union-funded initiative is to establish proper management, transparency and accountability in the public sector. The Panel welcomed this news as this may help to reduce the practice of opaque off-budget expenditure, which has been favoured for funding covert weapons procurement in violation of United Nations sanctions.

B. Rubber

142. Rubber production remains one of the major foreign exchange earners for the Government and the world's largest rubber estate — 90,000 acres with 11 million high-yielding trees at Harbel and Cavalla — is run by Firestone. Rubber production growth has reached a plateau. It increased by only 11 per cent in 2001 and low international market prices have affected profits. The rubber sector could begin an irreversible decline in years ahead. The gestation period for rubber trees is five to six years; considerable parts of the three main plantations are coming to the end of their productive life, and no significant replanting is under way. Rubber requires a longer-term approach and it remains a less easy target for "at source" off-budget expenditures, although once the profits enter the Government's accounts there is no guarantee on how they are used. The spread of the Lofa war has also affected rubber production, especially around Bomi.

143. The Government, in 2002, has removed its fuel tax exemption on the three main rubber producers and backdated the arrears. In December 2001 Parliament approved the Agriculture Concession Act, which effectively empowered the President to decide who was awarded new rubber concessions.

C. Logging

144. In its previous report (S/2001/1015) the Panel of Experts examined at length the timber industry and documented how in one case it had provided funds for weapons. Logging activities in 2001 apparently reached a plateau although it was one of the few areas of revenue growth for the Government because of efficiency in tax collection from logging activities, which netted $6 million extra in 2001 over the previous year.

145. The war in Lofa County has badly affected timber production, and resulted in the loss of equipment. It has contributed to a steep decline in traffic through the port of Monrovia. Port figures overall provided by Bureau Veritas (BIVAC) show that large amounts of timber continue to be exported through Buchanan in 2002.

146. International scrutiny of the timber industry has resulted in the announcement of two initiatives. In August 2001 President Taylor announced that for the first time since his election in 1997 significant development aid from his Government, totalling $7.5 million, will be distributed to five counties in south-eastern Liberia. These will be deducted from the total taxes collected annually from each county. Maryland, the home to some major logging companies will receive $4 million paid by those companies, Sinoe, Grand Gedeh and River Gee will receive $1 million each and Rivercess will receive $500,000. A presidential committee has been established to discuss projects with each county and the funds are budgeted for the 2001/2002 fiscal year.

147. In a second initiative the Government on 17 January 2002 signed a memorandum of understanding with the National Environmental Commission of Liberia and the United States-based Conservation International Foundation for establishing a biologically representative network of protected areas covering at least 30 per cent of the existing forest area, some 1.5 million hectares. This initiative has been widely welcomed by environmentalists.

148. The Panel found that the Forestry Development Agency was last audited by the Auditor General in 1994. It will however fall under the European Union-funded audit. According to the Agency, during 2001 the highest production of round logs was recorded in March, with a volume of 138,647,956 m^3, while in October the volume declined to 10,071 m^3. Total production for 2001 was put at 982,292,020 m^3 from 60 species of tree. Niangon represented some 12 per cent of total production in this period. There are 12 principal companies in the sector, which together produced 91.25 per cent of round logs in 2001. The Oriental Timber Company continued to dominate in 2001, with a total production of 484,087,982 m^3, accounting for 49.28 per cent of total production.

149. In 2001 the three main destinations of round logs from Liberia were China (451,877,144 m^3), France (98,694,358 m^3) and Italy (48,822,283 m^3). According to the Forestry Development Agency, FOB value reached $79,833,926.79. These figures are likely to be underestimates because of tax evasion by companies and widespread corruption but the inspection of logs by BIVAC in 2001 has increased the Government's tax revenue from timber significantly. From January to March 2002 BIVAC inspected 33,740,041 m^3 of log exports.

150. During its visit to Liberia the Panel continued to encounter keen advocates in non-governmental organizations and in the timber industry for the implementation of a United Nations embargo on round log exports and an independent audit of the industry. The Panel explained that this fell outside its immediate mandate but agreed to report these views. There were fewer advocates in Liberia for a total timber ban, although this remains an advocacy goal of a number of international non-governmental organizations.

D. Maritime and corporate registry

151. Liberia has the second largest maritime fleet in the world. In April 2002, Liberia's gross tonnage stood at 54,545,000 (29,191,000 net). There are to date 1,715 vessels registered under its flag of convenience (open registry).

152. In its previous report (S/2001/1015) the Panel of Experts documented how the Bureau of Maritime Affairs and its agent, the Liberian International Shipping and Corporate Registry, had been used for cover and funds for arms and transportation in violation of United Nations sanctions. The Commissioner of Maritime Affairs, Benoni Urey, continued to deny to the Panel that his Bureau was involved in such activities. The Panel has obtained additional documentation, including a passport and letter, showing that the arms dealer Sanjivan Ruprah had been a deputy commissioner of maritime affairs and maintained a close relationship with Urey.

153. A key finding of the Panel of Experts in its last report was that the Commissioner of Maritime Affairs and his Bureau are little more than a cash extraction operation and cover from which to fund and organize off-budget expenditures, including for sanctions-busting, and that the funds would need to be protected from Bureau misuse. The Ministry of Finance acted quickly and on 23 November 2001 announced that it would audit and ring-fence the Registry. On receipt of the funds the Ministry of Finance would channel the income through the Central Bank of Liberia and would segregate the funds for infrastructure, social, health and welfare development and support programmes.

154. On 3 December 2001 Liberia wrote to the International Monetary Fund requesting assistance to set up a financial monitoring mechanism. IMF replied on 14 December, welcoming the initiative, but claiming that the oversight proposed was primarily enterprise-specific and thus outside of the Fund's mandate. The Liberian authorities and their agent LISCR have continued to seek a credible organization to provide financial oversight of the maritime revenue.

155. Figures provided by the Central Bank of Liberia for 2001 continue to show irregularities in figures from the Ministry of Finance and the maritime agent LISCR. IMF noted, after its Article 4 consultations in December 2001, that reported payments from the shipping registry to the Government differed from collections at the Ministry of Finance by some $2 million, possibly reflecting deductions at source by BMA or timing differences in the transfer of funds from offshore accounts.

Table 3
Maritime remittances, 2001
(United States dollars)

January-February	*March-April*	*May-June*	*July-August*	*September-October*
387 272	489 091	1 198 181	0	3 356 363

Source: Central Bank of Liberia.

Table 4
Maritime remittances, September 2001 to February 2002
(United States dollars)

	Ministry of Finance	*LISCR*
September 2001	448 118	286 368
October 2001	555 463	254 503
November 2001	667 714	537 378
December 2001	1 902 308	1 990 741
January 2002	1 688 909	1 819 370
February 2002	993 187	893 593
Total	**6 255 771**	**5 781 885**

Source: Ministry of Finance and LISCR.

156. The Panel tried to examine the accounts of BMA but was informed that the generator had broken down and would be repaired only after the Panel had left Liberia. The Panel remains concerned about the activities of BMA. Although in October 2001 the authorities directed that government bank accounts be moved from commercial banks to the Central Bank of Liberia, BMA continues to maintain its three-signatory accounts at Ecobank in Monrovia. Although BMA should be funded by the Ministry of Finance with 10 per cent raised from the maritime revenues, the Panel found that it did not feature in the payroll status report of the Ministry of Finance (9 March 2002) and in the Bureau of the Budget's budget for the period from 1 July 2001 to 30 June 2002 BMA fell under the Government of Liberia

Special Commitment — budgeted for L$ 48 million, more than the Senate. According to the Auditor General, his office last audited BMA in 1988.

157. The Panel did obtain figures from the Central Bank of Liberia, LISCR and the Ministry of Finance. None of the figures match, and they show significant discrepancies illustrating the urgent need for independent auditing and oversight.

V. The travel ban

A. Complaints

158. The travel ban has continued to generate numerous complaints. Individuals on the list asked on what grounds they were on the list and how to appeal. The Panel also received several complaints from individuals who said that they had been wrongly accused of violating the ban by travelling. The Panel took all such complaints seriously and is investigating their veracity.

159. Following the publication of the Panel's previous report, the Government of Liberia circulated a memorandum reminding its officials not to travel. Indeed sightings of Liberian officials at Abidjan Airport have declined in 2002, owing to Monrovia's clamping down on certain types of travel for cost-saving and political reasons. However, a core of senior officials or business associates continues to flout the ban with impunity. A national of the Netherlands, Gus Kouwenhoven, has even boasted to the Liberian media that he travels regularly.

B. False passports

160. Problems with Liberian passports, including diplomatic passports, are well known and are also acknowledged by the Liberian authorities. According to the Government of Liberia, some embassies abroad have been involved in fraud. Much of the fraud and the lack of proper oversight due to the years of war had caused a proliferation of diplomatic passports without proper authorization.

161. President Taylor had all passports revoked in 1997 and new ones were introduced with unfalsifiable security features. The Foreign Ministry issues passports but other ministries may issue requests. The President also has discretionary powers to order the issuing of such passports. The Liberian National Investment Commission may also issue diplomatic passports to foreign businessmen who are appointed to find interested investors abroad. Since a special clause in the Liberian Constitution prohibits anyone not of Black African descent from becoming a Liberian citizen, foreigners can obtain some sort of honorary citizenship and become bearers of a Liberian diplomatic passport. Gus Kouwenhoven, for instance, has such a passport.

162. The Panel had during previous work in Liberia requested a full list of all the valid diplomatic passports that had been issued and a list was prepared by the Foreign Ministry, on the understanding that the list was not accurate. Foreign countries and Interpol regularly request clarification from Liberia on passports presented abroad. These requests are dealt with by the Liberian authorities and many irregularities had been rectified. Some cases related to wrongdoings by former

government officials or by embassies staffed with persons appointed by previous administrations, the Panel was informed.

163. The Panel has credible evidence, however, that the problem with diplomatic passports is also caused by the current authorities. As shown in the previous report, Sanjivan Ruprah, who was instrumental in arms supplies to Liberia, travelled with different diplomatic passports and under different names. For his sanctions-busting activities on behalf of the Government of Liberia he carried two different diplomatic passports as a deputy commissioner of the Bureau of Maritime Affairs. The Panel has now also found a document showing that Ruprah signed letters as deputy commissioner, on letterhead of the Bureau. The Panel wants to stress this point because, even after all the evidence presented in the previous report, the Commissioner of Maritime Affairs of Liberia kept claiming that Ruprah had nothing to do with his business.

164. The Panel found that a way to avoid being stopped at airports is for Liberian officials or businessmen affected by the United Nations travel ban to use multiple passports, issued under different names by the Liberian authorities. The Panel has obtained evidence of at least two such cases. Ambassador-at-Large Mohamed Salame, who plays a pivotal role in Liberia's operations through Côte d'Ivoire, has a diplomatic passport issued under his real name and another diplomatic passport, with a completely different identity, under the name of Ameri Al Jawad. The latter was issued in June 2001, just a few weeks after the imposition of the travel ban. In addition to copies of the two passports the Panel obtained corroborating documentary and direct oral evidence proving that Mohamed Salame has indeed been using that second passport while travelling. The Panel showed the pictures on these passports to several acquaintances of the Ambassador. All of them recognized both the pictures as those of Mohamed Salame. (See annex VIII.)

165. Another example is that of Moussa Cisse, a Guinean-born businessman who has been one of President Taylor's confidants for years and who plays a key role in the sale of diamonds and arms. The Panel has also obtained copies of both his passports, one a diplomatic passport under his own name as Chief of Protocol, Executive Mansion, and the other an ordinary Liberian passport under the name Mamadee Kamara. The Panel showed copies of both these passports to relatives and acquaintances of Moussa Cisse in Monrovia and they identified both the pictures as being of him. Copies of both these passports are in annex VIII to this report.

166. Another individual affected by the travel ban is Sam "Maskita" Bockarie of RUF. He was reported by the Panel in its previous report to be travelling under false names. The Ghanaian authorities have confirmed that Bockarie stayed in Accra in May 2001 under the assumed name of Sam Johnson (see para. 45 above).

167. During its previous visits to Liberia the Panel interviewed Gus Kouwenhoven at length and met him on different occasions. When the Panel questioned him about his breaches of the travel ban, he said he needed to travel for his business interests elsewhere in Africa. Although the Panel was not able to document this, several sources in Abidjan told the Panel he was seen there very frequently at the airport. Although the Panel inspected all the records and passenger lists of flights out of Monrovia from the start of the ban, his name did not appear in those records. The Panel also interviewed the owners of airlines in Abidjan. They did not know him as their customer. The Panel cannot explain how Mr. Kouwenhoven manages to travel without being recorded on passenger lists, unless he also has different passports or

travels under a false name. Many Liberians and expatriates in Monrovia and Côte d'Ivoire gave the Panel exact dates of his journeys from and to Liberia, always on Weasua flights, including:

- 22 December 2001, Gus Kouwenhoven arrived at Monrovia from Abidjan.
- 3 March 2002, Gus Kouwenhoven departed from Monrovia for Abidjan.
- 15 March 2002, Gus Kouwenhoven arrived at Monrovia from Abidjan.

Savings from the travel ban

President Taylor in his 2001/2002 budget speech, in November 2001, admitted that "with the imposition of United Nations sanctions on Liberia, came travel restrictions on certain officials of this government. While such action on the part of the United Nations limits our capacity to mobilize external commitments to our reconstruction needs, it curtails the proliferation of travel plans which, as we have seen in the past, have no bearing on the well-being of the people".

Indeed the travel ban may have contributed to some significant savings. International travel consumed around $600,000 of government funds per month in 1999. Following the Security Council travel ban many of these funds went unspent. Travel restrictions were extended to others not banned, further reducing expenditures. A circular reminding officials to respect the travel ban was circulated in November 2001 following the issuance of the report of the Panel of Experts (S/2001/1015) documenting violations. According to the Ministry of Finance these funds were first spent on fuel imports and more recently on helping to pay arrears of civil servants' salaries. This may have reduced government expenditures by about $400,000 per month, a quarter of the average bill for monthly public salaries.

VI. The impact of sanctions on Liberia

168. The perception of average Liberians is that sanctions are affecting them. The Government has since May 2001 conducted an anti-sanctions campaign blaming the United States, the United Kingdom and the United Nations for the imposition of sanctions. The Ministry of Information runs this campaign. There have been two phases to the campaign: a first poster and billboard campaign in April and May 2001 was followed by demonstrations and critical reports in the press.

169. In 2002 the campaign entered a second phase, with 1,000 new posters distributed around Monrovia to be put up in government buildings claiming "arms embargo killing our people" and "sanctions: killing our economy" (see annex IX). The Government has also been actively trying to keep the population in ignorance about the sanctions and the work of the Panel of Experts.

170. When *The News* newspaper published on 16 November 2001 a feature about violations of the travel ban, it found itself suddenly confronted by a massive tax arrears demand and was forced to cease publication for several weeks. The Panel, when invited to appear on radio DC-FM for a phone-in show on 4 April 2002, was at

the last moment discouraged from participating by the manager of the radio station. The public was told that the programme was postponed "for technical reasons".

171. In February 2002 the Senate Foreign Affairs Standing Committee in Monrovia held a series of hearings on the impact of sanctions, which included the testimonies of several respected persons from civil society who also called for sanctions to be lifted or modified. The Committee produced a confidential report on the sanctions, which also made recommendations on how to extricate Liberia from them. This was followed on 1 March 2002 by Senate resolution 003, which called on the United Nations to lift the arms embargo.

172. There have also been a variety of claims about the impact of sanctions. The University of Liberia Press Club, in a letter dated 14 January 2002 to UNOL, claimed that suicide rates had increased because of sanctions. One individual threatened to go on hunger strike because of United Nations sanctions but the Representative of the Secretary-General met him and encouraged him to consider an "exit" strategy because the "Council can take a long time to make a decision". The individual decided then not to continue with his hunger strike. The Liberian Council of Churches wrote to UNOL in January about the "suffering of the Liberian people, socially, psychologically, economically and spiritually".

173. The United Nations has been poor at defending the Security Council's decision to impose targeted sanctions. This has also been highlighted by the report of the Secretary-General (S/2001/939 of 5 October 2001) on the humanitarian impact. The Panel found that few people had read the report of the Panel of Experts and that in Liberia downloading the report from the Internet is a rare, costly and time-consuming luxury. The United Nations needs to proactively distribute hard copies of the Panel's reports to interested parties in Monrovia. Since the last report (S/2001/1015) is out of print, the Panel recommends that a second print run of 1,000 copies be arranged and that UNOL be requested to hold a series of workshops in Monrovia on the findings of the Panel to balance the one-sided nature of the current discussion.

174. Sanctions have caused some collateral damage. They and the war have contributed to the depreciation of the Liberian dollar. The Economist Intelligence Unit notes that until local traders abandon their practice of hoarding the United States dollar and refusing to do business in local currency, it will be difficult for the Government to stabilize the exchange rate. The state of emergency declared in February 2002 has increased the flight of capital and contributed more than the sanctions to a further downturn of consumer confidence. In public perception they are intertwined, however.

175. There has also been a steep increase in inflation since the imposition of sanctions. The rate of inflation was in single digits until July 2001, when inflation began to rise. By February 2002 the rate of inflation was recorded at 22.4 per cent, having risen from 3.8 per cent in May 2001 owing to rapid escalation in the prices of goods and services, in part because of sanctions but also because of the war and opportunistic profiteering by traders.

176. International non-governmental organizations also complained to the Panel that they still experience difficulties in finding funding from international donors for projects in Liberia but admitted this resulted as much from the Government's poor governance record and the war as from the sanctions. Liberia's relations with the World Bank group, however, have been frozen and will be re-evaluated when United Nations sanctions are lifted.

Annex I

Letter dated 5 March 2002 from the Secretary-General addressed to the President of the Security Council*

I have the honour to refer to Security Council resolution 1395 (2002) of 27 February 2002 concerning Liberia, in paragraph 3 of which the Council decided to re-establish the Panel of Experts on Liberia appointed pursuant to paragraph 19 of resolution 1343 (2001) for a further period of five weeks, commencing no later than 11 March 2002.

The Panel will conduct a follow-up assessment mission to Liberia and neighbouring countries, in order to investigate and compile a brief independent audit of the compliance by the Government of Liberia with paragraph 2 and of any violations of paragraphs 5, 6 and 7 of resolution 1343 (2001) and to report to the Council through the Committee established by paragraph 14 of resolution 1343 (2001). In paragraph 5 of resolution 1395 (2002), the Council requested that I appoint, in consultation with the Committee established by paragraph 14 of resolution 1343 (2001), no more than five experts to serve on the Panel.

Accordingly, I wish to inform you that, taking into account the requirements stated in resolution 1395 (2002), including that I draw, as much as possible and as appropriate, on the expertise of the members of the Panel of Experts established pursuant to resolution 1343 (2001), I have appointed the following four experts:

1. Mr. Atabou Bodian (Senegal, expert from the International Civil Aviation Organization)
2. Mr. Johan Peleman (Belgium, expert on arms and transportation)
3. Mr. Harjit Singh Sandhu (India, expert from Interpol)
4. Mr. Alex Vines (United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, expert on diamonds).

(*Signed*) Kofi A. **Annan**

* Previously issued under the symbol S/2002/237.

Annex II

Meetings and consultations

Côte d'Ivoire

Government
Airport Authority
Ministry of Mines, Geology and Environment
Ministry of Defence
Ministry of the Interior

Diplomatic, bilateral and multilateral agencies
Liberia
United Kingdom
United States of America
UNDP

Civil society
Centre for Democratic Empowerment
Modern Africa

Private sector
Air Inter Ivoire
Hotel Ivoire Inter-Continental

Others
Ms. Ellen Johnson-Sirleaf

Guinea

Government
Air Navigation Agency
Commissioner of Judicial Police
Directorate of Civil Aviation
Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Ministry of Defence
Ministry of Mines, Geology and Environment
Prefecture of Macenta
Sub-Prefecture of Daro
Village Chief of Badaro

Diplomatic, bilateral and multilateral agencies
Mano River Civil Society Movement Conference, Conakry
Secretariat of Roberts Flight Information Region
UNDP
UNHCR
United States of America

Private sector
Mr. Mohamed Yansane (Pecos)

Others
Liberian refugees in Daro and Kouankan camps

Liberia

Government
Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Ministry of Lands, Mines and Energy
Ministry of Transport
Ministry of Revenue
Ministry of Defence
Ministry of Finance
Office of the Auditor General
Bureau of Immigration and Naturalization
Bureau of Maritime Affairs
Central Bank of Liberia
Director of Civil Aviation
Expenditure Team (*Minister of Finance, Director of Budget, Deputy Minister of Revenue, Deputy Minister of Expenditure and Coordinator of International Economic Cooperation)*
Forestry Development Agency
Liberian Petroleum Refining Corporation
National Security Agency
Roberts International Airport
Task Force on Compliance with resolution 1343 (2001)

Diplomatic, bilateral and multilateral agencies
Canada
European Union
Guinea
Sierra Leone
UNDP
UNOL
United States of America

Civil society
Mr. Michael Kpakala Francis, Archbishop of Monrovia
Conservation International
Fauna & Flora International
Liberian Women Initiative
Médecins sans Frontières
National Campaign for Liberia's Survival (NACALS)
Save the Children, UK

Private sector
Mr. Eid, owner of Hotel Boulevard (now Hotel Royal)
Mr. George Haddad, head of Lebanese community
BIVAC
Diamond Star Company
Firestone
Global African Minerals

Mobil RIA
UMARCO (Liberia)

Media
Analyst
BBC
Reuters
The Enquirer
The News

Sierra Leone

Government
Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Ministry of Mineral Resources (in Freetown and Kenema)
Ministry of Justice
Sierra Leone Police (Special Branch and Criminal Investigation Department)
Sierra Leone Army

Private sector
American Diamonds in Bo
H. Shour and Sons
Ossailly Diamond office in Kenema
Rex Diamonds in Freetown
Salim Ossailly Diamond office in Bo

Diplomatic, bilateral and multilateral agencies
UNAMSIL
- Civilian police officers in Bo and Freetown
- Civil Affairs Officers in Bo
- Force Commander
- Military intelligence office, Freetown
- Military observers in Freetown, Bo and Buedu

United Nations Volunteers
United Kingdom

Civil society
Chiefs and Elders from Kailahun District
Civil Defence Force leaders at Brookefields Hotel, Freetown
International Crisis Group
RUFP representatives

Miscellaneous
Air West, Togo
Africa Confidential
Amnesty International
Conciliation Resources
De Beers
Diamond High Council (Hoge Raad voor Diamant), Belgium
Department of Defence, USA
Department of State, USA
Directorates of Civil Aviation, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Moldova and Togo
Economist Intelligence Unit
Foreign and Commonwealth Office, United Kingdom
Global Witness
Human Rights Watch
International Monetary Fund
International Peace Information Service, Belgium
Interpol General Secretariat, Lyon (France)
J.P. Airlines Fleet in Switzerland (Mr. Sommers)
LISCR
LURD representatives
Merlin
Oxfam UK
Samih Ossailly, diamond dealer
Tiramavia, Moldova
The Perspective
Wall Street Journal

Annex III

Letter dated 28 December 2001 from the Permanent Representative of Ghana to the United Nations addressed to the Chairman of the Panel of Experts

Further to my letter of 19 November 2001, which was in response to your letter of 1 October 2001, I wish to inform you that the Mission has been informed by the competent Ghanaian authorities that Mr. Sam Bockarie did visit Accra between 17 and 28 May 2001 and that he stayed at Ebony Hotel, Dzorwulu, in Accra under an assumed name, Sam Johnson, but has since not returned to Ghana.

I hope this information will be conveyed to the relevant United Nations bodies with a view to clearing Ghana of any suspicion of harbouring Mr. Sam Bockarie in violation of United Nations sanctions against Liberia.

(*Signed*) Nana **Effah-Apenteng**
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

Annex IV

Press release issued by the Government of Liberia

Monrovia-Micat — 15 February 2002 — An Antonov 12 Aircraft crashed early this morning, about 4 miles away from the approach to the Roberts International Airport (RIA) Runway, in Margibi County.

An Information Ministry release quotes the Transport Ministry and RIA authorities as saying, the Antonov 12 aircraft at about 5 p.m. this morning sought emergency landing permission while flying over Liberian Territory. The permission was granted.

However, a short time later, the release says the plane crashed and exploded upon impact.

Meanwhile, investigation into the crash is being undertaken by the Civil Aviation Department of the Ministry of Transport.

Annex V.A

Administrația de Stat a Aviației Civile a Republicii Moldova

State Administration of Civil Aviation Republic of Moldova

Airport, MD 2026 Chisinau Republic of Moldova
tel (373 2) 52 40 64 fax (373 2) 52 91 18

7 iunie 2001 № 1051

CERTIFICAT PRIVIND RADIEREA ÎNMATRICULĂRII

УДОСТОВЕРЕНИЕ О СНЯТИИ С РЕЕСТРА

CERTIFICATE OF CANCELLATION REGISTRATION

Se certifică prin prezenta că aeronava de tipul Ан-12АП, cu numărul de fabricație 4342610 cu înmatriculare anterioară ER-ADL, a fost radiată din Registrul Aerian de înmatriculare a aeronavelor civile din Republica Moldova, iar însemnele ER-ADL au fost anulate.

Уведомляется, что воздушное судно тип Ан-12АП, заводской номер 4342610, бортовой номер ER-ADL исключён из Авиационного Реестра гражданских воздушных судов Республики Молдова, а обозначение ER-ADL аннулировано.

This is to certify that the aircraft type ANTONOV Ан-12АП, serial number 4342610 formerly bearing nationality and registration marks ER-ADL has been removed from the Aviation Register of the Civil Aircraft of the Republic of Moldova and the marks ER-ADL have been cancelled.

Data:
Дата: 07.06.2001
Date:

Semnătura:
Подпись:
Signature:

Inspectorul de Stat Inspecția Tehnică

Annex V.B

Administraţia de Stat a Aviaţiei Civile a Republicii Moldova

State Administration of Civil Aviation Republic of Moldova

Airport, MD 2026 Chisinau, Republic of Moldova
tel (373 2) 52 40 64 fax (373 2) 52 91 18

07 iunie 2001 № *1049*

CERTIFICAT PRIVIND RADIEREA ÎNMATRICULĂRII

УДОСТОВЕРЕНИЕ О СНЯТИИ С РЕЕСТРА

CERTIFICATE OF CANCELLATION REGISTRATION

Se certifică prin prezenta că aeronava de tipul Ан-12БК, cu numărul de fabricaţie 7345403 cu înmatriculare anterioară ER-ACZ, a fost radiată din Registrul Aerian de înmatriculare a aeronavelor civile din Republica Moldova, iar însemnele ER-ACZ au fost anulate.

Уведомляется, что воздушное судно тип Ан-12БК, заводской номер 7345403, бортовой номер ER-ACZ исключён из Авиационного Реестра гражданских воздушных судов Республики Молдова, а обозначение ER-ACZ аннулировано.

This is to certify that the aircraft type ANTONOV Ан-12БК, serial number 7345403 formerly bearing nationality and registration marks ER-ACZ has been removed from the Aviation Register of the Civil Aircraft of the Republic of Moldova and the marks ER-ACZ have been cancelled.

Data: 07.06.2001
Дата:
Date:

Semnătura: _____
Подпись:
Signature:

Administraţia de Stat a Aviaţiei Civile a Republicii Moldova
Inspectorul de Stat
Inspecţia Tehnică

Annex VI.A

REPUBLIC OF MOLDOVA
STATE ADMINISTRATION
of CIVIL AVIATION
Airworthiness section
Kishinev

РЕСПУБЛИКА МОЛДОВА
ГОС. АДМИНИСТРАЦИЯ
ГРАЖДАНСКОЙ АВИАЦИИ
Отдел летной годности
Кишинев

REPUBLICA MOLDOVA
ADMINISTRAŢIA DE STAT
a AVIAŢIEI CIVILE
Secţia de navigabilitate
Chişinău

CERTIFICAT DE ÎNMATRICULARE
CERTIFICATE OF REGISTRATION
СВИДЕТЕЛЬСТВО О РЕГИСТРАЦИИ

№ 0360

1. Semnul de stat şi de înmatriculare State and registration marks Гос. и регистрационный знак	2. Modelul Model Обозначение воздушного судна изготовителем	3. Numărul de serie a navei aeriene Aircraft serial № Серийный номер воздушного судна
ER-ADL	ANTONOV -12AP	4342610

4. Deţinătorul şi adresa lui
Owner and owner's address
Собственник и его адрес
SABAA Tours & Travels Agency P.O.Box 761
Fujairah U.A.E. Tel/Fax.0097192220600

5. Certificat de navigabilitate №
Certificate of airworthiness №
Сертификат летной годности №
Diploma of Airworthiness 28.08.85.

6. Prin prezentul document se certifică, că nava aeriană sus-descrisă în modul corespunzător este înclusă în registrul de stat a navelor aeriene civile a Republicii Moldova în conformitate cu Convenţia Aviaţiei Civile Internaţionale adoptată la 7 decembrie 1944 şi cu regulile înregistrării navelor aeriene civile a Republicii Moldova.

It is hereby certified that the above described aircraft has been duly entered into the State Civil Aircraft Register of the Republic of Moldova in accordance with the Convention on International Civil Aviation signed at Chicago on 7 December, 1944 and with registration Rules of Civil Aircraft of the Republic of Moldova.

Настоящим документом удостоверяется, что вышеописанное воздушное судно должным образом занесено в Государственный реестр гражданских воздушных судов Республики Молдова в соответствии с Конвенцией о международной гражданской авиации, принятой 7 декабря 1944 года и правил регистрации гражданских воздушных судов Республики Молдова.

Semnătura
Signature
Подпись .Petrash

Data eliberării
Issue date
Дата выдачи 07.06.2001

Specialist of Register M.Budici

Annex VI.B

REPUBLIC OF MOLDOVA
STATE ADMINISTRATION
of CIVIL AVIATION
Airworthiness section
Kishinev

РЕСПУБЛИКА МОЛДОВА
ГОС. АДМИНИСТРАЦИЯ
ГРАЖДАНСКОЙ АВИАЦИИ
Отдел летной годности
Кишинев

REPUBLICA MOLDOVA
ADMINISTRAȚIA DE STAT
a AVIAȚIEI CIVILE
Secția de navigabilitate
Chișinău

CERTIFICAT DE ÎNMATRICULARE
CERTIFICATE OF REGISTRATION
СВИДЕТЕЛЬСТВО О РЕГИСТРАЦИИ

№ 0362

1. Semnul de stat și de înmatriculare State and registration marks Гос. и регистрационный знак	2. Modelul Model Обозначение воздушного судна изготовителем	3. Numărul de serie a navei aeriene Aircraft serial № Серийный номер воздушного судна
ER-ACZ	ANTONOV -12BK	7345403

4. Deținătorul și adresa lui
Owner and owner's address
Собственник и его адрес SABAA Tours & Travels Agency P.O.Box 761 Fujairah U.A.E. Tel/Fax.0097192220500

5. Certificat de navigabilitate №
Certificate of airworthiness №
Сертификат летной годности № Diploma of Airworthiness 28.08.85.

6. Prin prezentul document se certifică, că nava aeriană sus-descrisă în modul corespunzător este înscrisă în registrul de stat a navelor aeriene civile a Republicii Moldova în conformitate cu Convenția Aviației Civile Internaționale adoptată la 7 decembrie 1944 și cu regulile înregistrării navelor aeriene civile a Republicii Moldova.

It is hereby certified that the above described aircraft has been duly entered into the State Civil Aircraft Register of the Republic of Moldova in accordance with the Convention on International Civil Aviation signed at Chicago on 7 December, 1944 and with registration Rules of Civil Aircraft of the Republic of Moldova.

Настоящим документом удостоверяется, что вышеописанное воздушное судно должным образом занесено в Государственный реестр гражданских воздушных судов Республики Молдова в соответствии с Конвенцией о международной гражданской авиации, принятой 7 декабря 1944 года и правил регистрации гражданских воздушных судов Республики Молдова.

Semnătura
Signature
Подпись V.Petrash

Data eliberării
Issue date
Дата выдачи 07.06.200

Specialist of Register M.Budioi



REPUBLIC OF LIBERIA
MINISTRY OF LANDS, MINES AND [illegible]
DIAMOND APPRAISER OFFICE

Product: ROUGH (UNCUT) DIAMOND
Produit: DIAMOND BRUT

CERTIFICATE OF ORIGIN

Name and Address of Consignee_____ PARCEL CODE_____

_____

This is to Certify that Parcel No._____exported by_____

Dealership License No _____containing [illegible]

DIAMONDS as specified in Schedule 'B' No._____

Certificate was valued by the Government Diamond Appraiser on_____

UNDER THE AUTHORITY OF THE GOVERNMENT OF THE REPUBLIC [illegible]

DIAMOND	CARAT	VALUE [illegible]
GEM		
INDUSTRIAL		
TOTAL		

_____Day of_____200__



The Government of the Republic of Liberia requests all those whom it may concern to allow the bearer to pass freely without let or hindrance and to afford the bearer such assistance and protection as may be necessary.

Signed Passport Officer

Signed Holder

REPUBLIC OF LIBERIA / REPUBLIQUE DU LIBERIA

Passport
Passeport

Type / Type: Diplomatic

Surname / Nom: Salame

Given names / Prénoms: Mohamed

Date of birth / Date de naissance: September 22, 1961

Sex / Sexe: M Place of birth / Lieu de naissance: Abidjan, Cote d'Ivoire

Date of issue / Date de délivrance: January 11 1999

Date of expiry / Date d'expiration: January 10, 2001

AMBASSADOR-AT-LARGE
SPECIAL ENVOY

The Government of the Republic of Liberia requests all those whom it may concern to allow the bearer to pass freely without let or hindrance and to afford the bearer such assistance and protection as may be necessary.

Signed Passport Officer

Signed Holder

REPUBLIC OF LIBERIA / REPUBLIQUE DU LIBERIA

Passport
Passeport

Type / Type: Diplomatic

Surname / Nom: Ameri

Given names / Prénoms: Jawad Al

Date of birth / Date de naissance: October 18, 1963

Sex / Sexe: M Place of birth / Lieu de naissance: Ganta, Nimba Co., Liberia

Date of issue / Date de délivrance: June 20, 2001

Date of expiry / Date d'expiration: June 19, 2003

TRADE REPRESENTATIVE

TWO DIPLOMATIC PASSPORTS OF MOHAMED SALAME



The Government of the Republic of Liberia requests all those whom it may concern to allow the bearer to pass freely without let or hindrance and to afford the bearer such assistance and protection as may be necessary.

Signed
Passport Officer

Signed
Holder

REPUBLIC OF LIBERIA / REPUBLIQUE DU LIBERIA

Passport
Passeport

Type / Type: Diplomatic

Surname / Nom: Cisse

Given names / Prénoms: Moussa

Date of birth / Date de naissance: December 24, 1946

Sex / Sexe: M. Place of birth / Lieu de naissance: Ganta, Nimba Co, Liberia

Date of issue / Date de délivrance: August 31, 1999

CHIEF OF PROTOCOL
EXECUTIVE MANSION
R. L.

Date of expiry / Date d'expiration: August 30, 2001

LIBERIAN NATIONALITY
NATIONALITE LIBERIANE

The Government of the Republic of Liberia requests all those whom it may concern to allow the bearer to pass freely without let or hindrance and to afford the bearer such assistance and protection as may be necessary.

Signed
Passport Officer

Signed
Holder

REPUBLIC OF LIBERIA / REPUBLIQUE DU LIBERIA

Passport
Passeport

Type / Type: Ordinary

Surname / Nom: Kamara

Given names / Prénoms: Mamadee

Date of birth / Date de naissance: July 26, 1944

Sex / Sexe: M. Place of birth / Lieu de naissance: Gbarnga, Bong Co, Liberia

Date of issue / Date de délivrance: January 10, 2000

Date of expiry / Date d'expiration: January 9, 2005

TWO PASSPORTS OF MOUSSA CISSE

Annex IX

SANCTIONS KILLING OUR ECONOMY

ARMS EMBARGO KILLING OUR PEOPLE

UN, UK, US, LIBERIAN CHILDREN DESERVE TO LIVE

United Nations S/2002/471

Security Council

Distr.: General
19 April 2002

Original: English

United States of America: draft resolution

The Security Council,

Reaffirming its resolutions 242 (1967) of 22 November 1967, 338 (1973) of 22 October 1973, 1397 (2002) of 12 March 2002, 1402 (2002) of 30 March 2002, 1403 (2002) of 4 April 2002, and the Statement of its President of 10 April 2002 (S/PRST/2002/09),

Concerned by the dire humanitarian situation of the Palestinian civilian population, in particular reports from the Jenin refugee camp of an unknown number of deaths and destruction,

Calling for the lifting of restrictions imposed, in particular in Jenin, on the operations of humanitarian organizations, including the International Committee of the Red Cross and United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East,

Stressing the need for all concerned to ensure the safety of civilians, and to respect the universally accepted norms of international humanitarian law,

1. *Emphasizes* the urgency of access of medical and humanitarian organizations to the Palestinian civilian population;

2. *Welcomes* the initiative of the Secretary-General to develop accurate information regarding recent events in the Jenin refugee camp through a fact-finding team and requests him to keep the Security Council informed;

3. *Decides* to remain seized of the matter.

02-34527 (E) 190402

United Nations S/2002/472

Security Council

Distr.: General
22 April 2002
English
Original: Arabic

Letter dated 18 April 2002 from the Permanent Representative of Iraq to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

On instructions from my Government, I have the honour to transmit to you herewith a letter dated 18 April 2002 from Mr. Naji Sabri, Minister for Foreign Affairs of Iraq. Appended to the Minister's letter is a table showing the violations of Iraq's international boundaries that were committed by United States and British warplanes flying across the demilitarized zone monitored by the United Nations Iraq-Kuwait Observation Mission (UNIKOM) in the period from 2 March to 5 April 2002.

The Minister urges you to instruct UNIKOM to perform its duties in full, to report these violations to the Security Council through you as soon as they occur and to specify the number and nationality of the warplanes that violate the demilitarized zone, given that such violations constitute wanton aggression against the people, sovereignty and territory of Iraq, as well as against United Nations peacekeeping operations. He further asks you to alert the Security Council to its responsibility to halt this aggression and ensure that its perpetrators are held accountable for it under international law.

I should be grateful if you would have the present letter and its annex circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Mohammed A. **Aldouri**
Permanent Representative

02-34675 (E) 230402 230402

BEST COPY AVAILABLE

Annex to the letter dated 18 April 2002 from the Permanent Representative of Iraq to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

Further to our letter dated 23 March 2002 (S/2002/308, annex), I should like to inform you that in the period from 2 March to 5 April 2002 United States and British warplanes flying from bases in Kuwait, from Kuwait's airspace and territorial waters and by way of the demilitarized zone monitored by the United Nations Iraq-Kuwait Observation Mission (UNIKOM) committed 181 violations of our international boundaries. As shown in the table appended to this letter, the relevant Iraqi agencies have determined that the violations committed were as follows:

1. Armed aerial activity by the United States and the United Kingdom, violating our international boundaries from Kuwait, from Kuwait's airspace and territorial waters and by way of the demilitarized zone, comprised 181 armed sorties in the Dhi Qar, Muthanna, Basrah, Maysan and Qadisiyah governorates.

2. Our technical systems identified the aircraft violating Iraq's airspace on a daily basis as American F-14s, F-15s, F-16s and F-18s and British Tornadoes.

3. An AWACS aircraft operating inside Saudi airspace and an E-2C aircraft operating inside Kuwaiti airspace provided support to all of the United States and British aircraft that carried out armed and hostile sorties, violating Iraq's airspace by way of the demilitarized zone.

4. Between 2 March and 5 April 2002, a total of 11 remotely piloted aircraft violated Iraq's airspace from United States and British bases in Kuwait, from Kuwait's airspace and territorial waters and by way of the demilitarized zone.

All of the violations in question were committed by way of the demilitarized zone in which UNIKOM is stationed. One of UNIKOM's primary responsibilities is to monitor such hostile military operations and to report them and endeavour to halt them immediately.

UNIKOM detected many of these violations, and in its report for the period 25 September 2001 to 20 March 2002 (S/2002/323) it notes 421 violations and states that some of the United States aircraft that committed them were F-18s and A-10s. The number of United States and British aircraft violating the demilitarized zone that is reported by UNIKOM is much lower than the actual number of 935 reported by the Iraqi authorities concerned. We urge the United Nations Secretariat to provide UNIKOM with systems capable of detecting all of the violations so that it can notify the Security Council to take the necessary measures to halt these infringements forthwith. In another respect, even if UNIKOM did not have the systems needed to identify the type and nationality of these aircraft, the fact that they come from the direction of Kuwait confirms that they are those of the United States and the United Kingdom. Your report on UNIKOM for the period from 28 March to 4 September 2001 (S/2001/913) indicates as much, and paragraph 6 states that "[it should be noted] that the mission's inability to identify the States responsible for conducting such flights is in no way to be understood as condoning them". You also state in the report that the United States and the United Kingdom have acknowledged that they are continuing to enforce a no-flight zone in southern Iraq.

I accordingly urge you once more to instruct UNIKOM to perform its duties in full, to report these violations to the Security Council through you as soon as they occur and to specify the number of United States and British warplanes that violate the demilitarized zone and commit aggression against Iraq, given that this constitutes State terrorism and wanton aggression against Iraq and against its people, its sovereignty and its territory, as well as against United Nations peacekeeping operations. I also ask you to alert the Security Council to its responsibility to halt this aggression and ensure that its perpetrators are held accountable for it under international law.

(*Signed*) Naji **Sabri**
Minister for Foreign Affairs

Enclosure

Hostile aerial activity violating Iraq's international boundaries from Kuwait and by way of the demilitarized zone, 2 March-5 April 2002

No.	*Date*	*From*	*Time*	*Type*	*Armed sorties*	*Altitude (metres)*	*Speed (km/h)*	*Areas overflown*
1	2-15 March	Kuwait	0730-2100	F-14, F-15, F-18, drone	33, including 5 drones	8,000-12,000	240-780	Basrah, Busayyah, Salman, Qal'at Salih, Lasaf, Qurnah, Amarah, Suq al-Shuyukh, Shatrah, Jabayish
2	16 March-5 April	Kuwait	0810-2200	F-14, F-15, F-16, drone	148, including 6 drones	8,000-11,000	180-780	Basrah, Nasiriyah, Salman, Ashbajah, Artawi, Busayyah, Samawah, Amarah, Lasaf, Jalibah, Qurnah

Total sorties: 181

United Nations A/56/928–S/2002/473

General Assembly
Security Council

Distr.: General
22 April 2002
English
Original: Arabic

General Assembly
Fifty-sixth session
Agenda item 42
The situation in the Middle East

Security Council
Fifty-seventh year

Letter dated 19 April 2002 from the Chargé d'affaires a.i. of the Permanent Mission of Lebanon to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

In response to Israel's letters dated 2 and 3 April 2002 (A/56/898-S/2002/345 and A/56/899-S/2002/348), which contain the customary allegations, sophistries and fabrications, we should like to state as follows:

1. The assertion that Hizbullah's attacks on Israeli occupation outposts are "unprovoked" is inadmissible and singular inasmuch as occupation in itself is aggression and provocation. In successive reports on the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon, the Secretary-General of the United Nations, Mr. Kofi A. Annan, has also characterized Israel's daily violations of Lebanon's sovereignty in the air, on the ground and at sea as acts of provocation.

2. The Lebanese Shab`a farmlands are, by Israel's own admission, occupied territory. According to the Charter of the United Nations and the relevant resolutions of the Organization, especially General Assembly resolution 46/51 of 9 December 1991, peoples have the right to struggle for the restoration of occupied territory. A distinction must therefore be made between the actions of Hizbullah against the Israeli occupation and international terrorism, including the State terrorism in which Israel engages and which Lebanon condemns in the strongest terms. Israel's endeavour to link acts of legitimate resistance with the substance of Security Council resolution 1373 (2001) is therefore a shameless attempt to justify its manifestly aggressive intentions with regard to Lebanon.

3. In connection with certain incidents that have recently taken place in southern Lebanon outside the Lebanese Shab`a farmlands area, the Lebanese Minister of Defence has stated that, while affirming the right and duty of the Lebanese Government, the resistance and the people to liberate the Shab`a farmlands using all legitimate means, the Lebanese Government is committed to keeping the situation along the Blue Line from Naqurah to the Shab`a farmlands under control. The Lebanese security forces deployed in the South have reinforced their ground patrols and have succeeded in arresting a number of non-Lebanese armed elements who brought in and launched three rockets while acting alone and outside the framework

of the resistance formula to which Lebanon adheres, namely that of liberating that part of Lebanese territory that remains under Israeli occupation.

4. Hizbullah is a Lebanese political party that is represented in the National Assembly and participated actively in the liberation of the greater part of Lebanon's South from Israeli occupation.

5. Instead of pressure being brought to bear on Hizbullah, as the Israeli letters suggest, for acts of resistance to occupation to be halted Israel must withdraw from the territory it is occupying by force in the Shab'a farmlands and from all the occupied Arab territories in accordance with the provisions of the relevant United Nations resolutions.

6. While affirming its legitimate right to complete the liberation of those parts of its territory that are occupied by Israel, Lebanon renews its commitment to a just and comprehensive peace in accordance with the Madrid formula and the principle of land for peace, which was endorsed at the Arab Summit Conference held in Beirut on 27 and 28 March 2002 and in the Beirut Declaration and the final communiqué of the Summit containing the Arab peace initiative.

I should be grateful if you would have this letter circulated as a document of the General Assembly, under agenda item 42, and of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Houssam Asaad **Diab**
Chargé d'affaires a.i.